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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In discussions of the role of the assumption of profit maximization in 
the economic theory of the firm,  reference is often made to the Darwinian 
principle of"  survival of the fittest."  It is argued that,  in the economic sphere, 
the "fittest" are the profit maximizers.  The competitive struggle for survival 
will tend to eliminate from the economy the firms which fail to conform to the 
profit maximization assumption.  Theories based on that assumption may there­
fore have empirical relevance and validity even if the assumption is highly im­
perfect as a  description of the motives and decision making procedures of man­
agers and entrepreneurs.  In its typical role in the economic literature,  this 
argument has served as a line of defense of the standard theory of the firm 
against attackers who argue that the fundamental assumption of the theory fails 
to correspond to the observable realities of decision making in firms. 
The classic statement of this "survival argument" was made by Armen 
Alchian in his 1950 article,  "Uncertainty,  Evolution,  and Economic Theory.,,1 
For the most part,  the discussion of the argument since that time has been 
fragmentary,  consisting of a  few sentences here and a  paragraph there,  writ­
ten either in praise or in condemnation.2  In spite of the frequent references to 
1.  Armen A.  Alchian,  "Uncertainty,  Evolution and Economic Theory," 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 58 (June 1950),  pp. 211-222.  The original 
stimulus for the present paper was derived from Alchian's provocative work 
on this subject.  (Subsequent citations to Alchian are to this article,  as re­
printed in R. Heflebower and G. Stocking, eds.,  Readings in Industrial Organi­
zation and Public Policy (Homewood,  Illinois:  Richard D. Irwin Co. for the 
American Economic Association,  1958),  pp. 207-219.) 
2.  Among the non-fragmentary discussions,  one may cite:  Milton Friedman, 
Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press. 
1953),  pp. 19-23; and Edith T. Penrose,  "Biological Analogies in the Theory 
of the Firm," American Economic Review,  Vol. 42 (Dec. 1952),  pp. 804-819. 
Also,  the comments on the Penrose article by Alchian and Stephen Enke.  and 
the rejoinder by Penrose,  American Economic Review,  Vol. 43 (September 
1953),  pp. 600-07 (cited as Alchian,  Enke,  Penrose).  There is a  short (and, 
it will be argued.  unsatisfactory) analysis of the problem in G. S. Becker, 
"Irrational Behavior::  Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
70 (February 1962),  pp. 1-13.  For very brief but valuable remarks on the 
problem,  see T. C. Koopmans,  Three Essays on the State of Economic Sci­
~ (New York:  McGraw Hill Book Co.,  1957),  pp. 139-142; and G. C. Archi­
bald,  "The State of Economic Science," British Journal of the Philosophy of 
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the argument in the context of methodological controversy, _Alchian's contri 
bution has attracted little attention as a matter for theoretical examination in 
its own right.  In this paper,  the attempt is made to examine systematically 
the implications of the "natural selection" mechanism and to determine the 
extent to which the selection argument lends support to the conventional the­
ory of the profit maximizing firm-or,  alternatively,  the extent to which it 
leaves the door open to marginally or drastically different approaches to the 
problem of theorizing about the behavior of firms. 
A. Criticisms of the Assumption of Profit Maximization 
It will be helpful to begin by summarizing the common lines of attack 
on the assumption of profit maximization,  since the first goal of the present 
inquiry is to evaluate the effectiveness of the selection argument as a  defense 
against these attacks.  I  classify the lines of criticism into three broad cate­
gories:  The first line of criticism argues that it may be appropriate to con­
sider firms (more precisely,  their top decision makers) as having goals,  but 
it is not in general appropriate to assume that the goals are well summarized 
in the phrase • maximization of profits."  The second line of criticism argues 
that it is unreasonable to speak of firms as having goals (Le., a  preference or­
dering on the states of the world) at all,  and.! fortiori that it is unreasonable 
to speak of them as having the goal of profit maximization.  The third line of 
criticism emphasizes the impossibility of profit maximization on the ground 
that the information and information processing requirements of profit maxi­
mization in a world of continuous dynamic change are patently in excess of 
the resources for obtaining and processing information that are available to 
real world firms. 
There are several lines of argument that converge in the conclusion 
that a  single minded devotion to profits is not likely to characterize the top 
decision makers of firms.  Of particular importance is the classic observa­
tion that ownership and control are separated in the modern large corpora­
tion. 1  The stockholders,  who as the residual claimants on the income stream 
generated by the firm may be presumed to have a  strong interest in profits,  2 
Science, Vol. 10  (May 1959), pp. 58-69.  The recurring pattern of remarks on 

the argument that go little beyond mere allusion to its existence may be illus­

trated by the methodological discussion before the 1962 meetings of the Amer­

ican Economic Association:  American Economic Review, Vol. 53 (May 1963), 

pp.230 (Simon) and 235 (Samuelson).  Portions of the analysis in the present 

paper were presented (under the same title) to the Econometric SOciety in De­

cember 1960.  That paper was circulated by The RAND Corp., Santa Monica, 

California (P- 2116, December 1960), and is abstracted in Econometrica, 

VoL 29 (July 1961), p. 457. 

1.  A. A. Berle, Jr., and G. C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property (New York:  The Macmillan Co., 1933). 
2.  More precisely, the stockholders may be presumed to have a  strong in­
terest in dividends and in appreciation of the price of the stock. 
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have only a  tenuous control over the selection of the top management of the 
firm,  and no direct control over such" details"  as price and output determina­
tion or investment policy. 1  The salaried managers who do exercise the direct 
control over these matters may be presumed to have preference functions 
which do not depend on profits alone-in particular,  it is strongly argued that 
the salaries and security of such managers depend on the growth of the firm, 
as measured by the increase in its total revenue. 2  Also,  the executives of 
large corporations are not indifferent to their prestige in the community, and 
it seems unlikely that this prestige is uniquely and positively related to the 
level of the firm's profits.3  Still other objectives may 'compete with profits 
in the executive's utility function,  e.g., as Hicks suggested,  the desire for a 
quiet life.4 
However,  one need not appeal to the case of the large corporation in 
order to bring into question the motivational assumption of profit maximiza­
tion.  To predict that the behavior of the owner-manager of a  retail store is 
consistent with the assumption of profit maximization is to predict that he 
eats,  sleeps,  watches television and plays with his children only to the extent 
that will maximize his efficiency as the manager of his store.  If any of these 
activities enter his utility fUnction in their own right,  he will not behave as a 
profit maximizer but will to a  certain extent sacrifice profits to the attainment 
1.  See R.  A.  Gordon,  Business Leadership in the Large Corporation (Wash­
ington:  The Brookings Institution,  1945),  especially Chapter VIII,  for a dis­
cussion of the influence of the stockholders on the decision process.  Also, 
A. G. Papandreou.  "Some Basic Problems in the Tl'leory of the Firm,"  in 
B. F. Haley, ed., A Survey of Contemporary Economics, Vol. II (Homewood. 
Illinois:  Richard D. Irwin Co. for the American Economic Association, 1952), 
pp. 183-219.  Papandreou summarizes the evidence on various external in­
fluences on decision makers in firms.  and in general provides an excellent 
statement of the point of view now being summarized. 
2.  In particular.  this is the thesis developed by W. J. Baumol,  Business 
Behavior.  Value and Growth (New York:  The Macmillan Co.,  1959).  espe­
cially,  in Chapter 6. 
3.  Of particular relevance in this connection is the rise of a  business ide­
ology which emphasizes the responsibilities of corporate management toward 
consumers, labor and the community at large rather than toward stockholders 
alone.  See F. X. Sutton,  with Harris,  Kaysen,  and Tobin,  The American Busi­
ness Creed (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press,  1956).  See also Milton 
Friedman,  Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago:  Phoenix Books,  1962),  pp.133­
36,  where it is strongly argued that the new business creed is incompatible 
with the basic prinCiples of capitalism. 
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of other goals)  In general.  then.  it appears to be highly doubtful that the mo­
tivations of the managers of firms are adequately summarized as a  desire for  consi 
maximum profits.  more 
The second line of argument mentioned above denies that a  firm (or its 
management) has goals at all in the sense of there existing a  preference order­
ing on states of the world such that the firm's decisions always amount to the 
choice of the most preferred attainable situation.  The typical response to the 
highly complex decision problem confronting a large organization-with the at­
tendant uncertainties,  the necessity for dividing the task of decision making 
among several individuals,  and so forth-is said to be a  process of search 
which terminates when some satisfactory solution to the problem is found. 
rather than when an optimal solution is found. 2  Indeed,  since the decision 
problem confronting a  firm is not fully structured for it ~  priori,  as the tra­
ditional theory of the firm assumes it to be, the search for an optimum posi­
tion would be of indeterminate length and the notion that the firm searches for 
such a position is either meaningless or hopelessly impractical.3  Thus,  what 
is crucial in predicting the behavior of the firm is an understanding of the dy­
namics of its search processes and of the influences which determine the sort 
of solution that is considered" satisfactory." 
1.  For more extensive analyses from a  similar point of view, see T. Scitovsky, 
"A Note on Profit Maximization," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 11 (Winter 
1943). pp. 57-60; M. Reder, "A Reconsideration of the Marginal Productivity 
Theory," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 55 (Oct. 1947), pp. 450-58; B. Hig­
gins,  .. Elements of Indeterminacy in the Theory of Non-perfect Competition," 
American Economic Review,  Vol.  29  (Sept. 1939), pp. 468-479. 
2.  This is the view that firms are satisficers rather than maximizers.  See 
H. A. Simon,  .. A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,"  Quarterly Journal of 
Economics,  Vol. 69 (February 1955),  pp. 99-118.  A  similar view (though 
stated in a  narrower context) was advanced by R. A. Gordon,  "Short Period 
Price Determination in Theory and Practice,"  American Economic Review, 
Vol. 38 (June 1948),  pp. 265-288. 
3.  It is this consideration which constitutes the basic objection to any attempt 
to subsume satisficing behavior as a  special type of maximizing behavior that 
is appropriate for certain "optimum search"  problems.  Of course,  as pointed 
Inc., out above,  any behavior can in one way or another be rationalized as maxi­
poses mizing behavior.  But to identify satisficing behavior with optimum search be­
depen havior is merely to push the crucial problem back a  stage:  How does it happen 
on the that the task of learning about the relevant probability distributions,  the ability 
decisii to identify the  problem as  one  requiring  a  certain type  of  search proce­
do not  dure,  and the ability to determine the precise procedure required,  are within 
prefe the  limited information obtaining-and-processlng resources of the  deci­
sion maker?  This point  is  discussed further  in Section V.  2.  G. 
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A further reason for doubting that firms can be regarded as having 
consistent preference orderings is the fact that,  except in the smallest firms, 
more than one person is generally involved in the decision process.  (The 
concept of more than one person being involved in the decision process may 
be taken to mean that no single individual's preferences are controlling of the 
firm's decision in every situation.)  The interests (as summarized in utility 
functions) of these individuals are in general not identical; for example.  each 
of several vice presidents or other executives of a  company may aspire to 
the presidency.  There must then exist Some procedur.e for compromising the 
differences among the decision makers or determining whose preferences shall 
be controlling when any particular issue is faced.  It is well known that some 
common procedures for arriving at group decisions,  e.g.•  majority rule,  do 
not necessarily display the properties of completeness and transitivity that are 
required if a  preference function is to be imputed to the group as a  whole'! 
Thus it is at least doubtful that the procedures actually employed yield results 
such that the firm as a  whole can be regarded as acting rationally.  And since 
divergence of interests implies concern with matters other than the firm's 
profits,  it is still less probable that the firm as a  whole can be regarded <.lS 
acting rationally in the pursuit of profits. 
The third line of criticism emphasizes the limitations on the informa­
tion available to the decision Trlakers and the consequent impossibility of profit 
maximization.  Criticism of this type is obviously most relevant to the com­
pletely statical,  perfect information versions of the theory of the firm.  Once 
it is recognized that real world firms operate in a  context in which the profit 
implications of alternative courses of action are imperfectly known, it is usu­
ally considered necessary to replace the concept of profit maximization by 
Some concept of utility maximization over alternative probability distributions 
of profits.  But there is no choice for such a  utility function which has obvious 
descriptive realism,  and the behavior predicted depends on the choice that is 
made.2  Stin further complications are introduced when it is recognized that 
1.  I  am suggesting here that the problem of arriving at a  .. firm welfare func­
tion" which the firm can be considered to maximize has some points in com­
mon with the problem of arriving at a  "social welfare function" that meets cer­
tain criteria of reasonableness.  (The formulation of the latter problem,  and 
the demonstration that for some plausible criteria it has no solution,  is due to 
K. J. Arrow,  Social Choice and Individual Values (New York:  John Wiley &  Sons, 
Inc.,  1951).)  However,  the two problems are not identical.  For present pur­
poses the emphasis is not on whether there exists a  firm welfare function that 
depends on the preferences of individual decision makers in certain ways,  but 
on the fact that certain appealing and often-practiced ways of reaching group 
deciSions (such as majority rule,  flipping a  coin,  "taking turns,"  "logrolling") 
do not in general give rise to a  pattern of decisions that is consistent with any 
preference ordering. 





SIDNEY  G.  WINTER,  JR. 
the firm can act to reduce the uncertainty with which it is confronted,  but that 
such action-the acquiring of more information-is generally costly.  For this 
means that the costs of obtaining and processing the information required for 
a  close approach to a profit maximizing price and output policy (for example) 
may outweigh the benefits of such close calculation,  so that a firm which max­
imized profits without regard to information costs would not actually be maxi­
mizing profits at all.  If so,  the price and output policy of a firm which actually 
pursued maximimum profits could not be predicted without reference to the 
costs of obtaining and processing iQformation,  and the traditional formulations 
of the theory of the firm have no room for these costs.1 
An alternative approach to the problem posed by uncertainty is to as­
sume that the attempt is made to maximize profits on the basis of some "best 
guess" as to what the future holds,  but that the resulting policy is then quali­
fied in some way by a  concern with the possibility of unfavorable outcomes. 
Again,  there is a  considerable range of choice as to the particular assumptions 
which would capture the essence of this type of decision making process. 2 
the decision problem facing the firm when the profit implications of different 
courses of action are imperfectly known: "The Theory of Choice under Subjec­
tive Risk and Uncertainty," Econometrica, Vol. 9  (July-October 1941). pp. 298­
304; "A Contribution to the Non-static Theory of Production," in Studies in Mathe­
matical Economics and Econometrics, Lange, McIntyre and Yntema, eds. (Chi­
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).  A noteworthy but little noticed aspect 
of Professor Friedman's methodological position (!?E•.£!!.) is his comment in a 
footnote (note 16, p. 21)  to the effect that he uses the term "maximization of ex­
pected returns" to cover behavior consistent with maximization of any utility 
function over probability distributions of returns.  I  am not aware of any empir­
ical work in which refutable implications with respect to market behavior of this 
very general hypothesis are subjected to test; indeed, it is hard to think of exam­
ples of theoretical work in which such implications are developed. If  taken seri­
ously, this interpretation would place Friedman's position very close to complete,  sumptions.
tautological, subjectivism.  (See subsection B.) But he does not avail himself of  deal of atte 
this wide open escape route; he seems to say that he is willing to take his risks  volved.  Tt 
with the success or failure (to a tolerable approximation!) of the market impli­ to profit m, 
cations of the statical, perfect information version of price theory.  named; it i 
1.  Some recent theoretical work does make room for them, however, particularly  diction of e 
the .. economic theory of teams" developed by J. Marschak, R. Radner and others.  of the extel 
For an introduction to the basic concepts of this theory, see J. Marschak,  .. Theory  block in th~ 
react to ml of an Efficient Several-Person Firm," American Economic Review, Vol. 50 (May 
predict the 1960), pp.541-48. 
their objec
2.  See the discussion of this approach in William Fellner, Competition Among the  cisions.  'I 
Few (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949), pp. 146-157.  Fellner suggests that a  a  judgment 
concern for  safety margins" may be at least a partial explanation for the prac­ U  it cannot. 
tice of average cost priCing.  The specific model of an economic selection process 
presented in Section IV below seems to lend some support to this argument, al­
though, strictly speaking, the conclusions developed there relate to the output pol­
1.  Friedn: icies of competitive firms rather than to the price-output policies of monopolis­
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The implications of imperfect and costly information go still farther. 
The entire problem of oligopolistic interdependence,  with the attendant am­
biguities in the concept of a profit maximizing price and output policy,  can be 
subsumed under this heading: It is the absence of well founded information as 
to the responses that the firm's rivals will make that makes it difficult to 
structure the problem facing the firm.  Imperfections in information also re­
inforce the observation that the goals of particular managers may not coincide 
with the goal of maximum profits for the firm.  The vice president who aspires 
to the presidency of the company may,  without being detected,  sacrifice the 
profits of the company to his own ambitions-as when he conceals his past mis­
takes.  They include the fact that stockholders cannot learn whether the de­
pressed profits of a  company are the result of factors over which the manage­
ment has no control,  or whether they reflect the fact that the management is 
pursuing objectives other than profits-the quiet life and the respect of the com­
munity.  In general,  the fact that the stockholders cannot" check up" with per­
fect effectiveness on the actions of the president,  or the president on the ac­
tions of the vice presidents,  and so on, means that individuals are to some ex­
tent free to pursue their own goals at the expense of the profits of the firm. 
B.  Replies to the Criticisms 
In addition to the selection argument itself,  there are two prominent 
points of view which dispute the relevance or persuasiveness of the foregoing 
criticisms.  The first of these,  which is particularly associated with the name 
of Milton Friedman,1 simply denies that any information or argument which re­
lates to events within firms has any bearing on the adequacy of the assumption 
of profit maximization as the basis for the economic theory of the firm.  The 
second position is less clearly delineated and more widely held; the common 
thread running through the various arguments is that the necessary modifica­
tions in the theory of the firm can and should be made without discarding the 
fundamental assumption of profit maximization. 
Since Professor Friedman's methodological position on the role of as­
sumptions in economic theory has attracted and continues to attract a  great 
deal of attention and criticism,  I  will not go into detail here on the issues in­
volved.  The most succinct statement of the Friedman position (as it relates 
to profit maximization) would seem to be that the theory of the firm is mis­
named; it is not a  theory of the firm at all in the sense of being useful for pre­
diction of events within any particular firm.  The theory of the firm is a  theory 
of the external (market) behavior of the firm; more importantly,  it is a building 
block in the theory of firm~, i.e., the theory of how firms in the aggregate will 
react to market situations.  Thus,  in particular,  the theory of the firm does not 
predict the answers that decision makers in firms will give when queried about 
their objectives,  nor does it predict how they will go about reaching their de­
ClSlOns.  This being the case,  how can evidence on these points be relevant to 
a  judgment about the predictive power of the theory?  Clearly,  says Friedman, 
it cannot.  But the theory does yield hypotheses about what will be observed in 
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market situations; for this purpose,  Friedman says,  it has served well,  and 
there are no appealing substitutes for it.  1 
In considering this position,  the first and central issue to be confronted 
is whether it is legitimate to protect the assumption of profit maximization 
from test on the basis of evidence relating to the internal workings of firms. 
As against the legitimacy of putting such a  shield around the assumption of 
profit maximization, it may be observed that the theory of the firm certainly 
can be read as saying something about the internal workings of firms.  Sup­
pose,  for a  moment,  that the,various studies which have been made of the goal 
and procedures of decision makers in firms had consistently arrived at the 
conclusion that top decision makers obtain some summary of production pos­
sibilities and costs from the production department,  a  review of the market 
situation from the sales department,  and then set about investigating price and 
output policies with a  view to finding the one that would yield maximum profits. 
Would Friedman,  or anybody else,  have then argued that whatever the interest 
in these conclusions might be,  they had no bearing on the acceptability of the 
assumption of profit maximization and the rest of the traditional theory?  It 
seems safe to say that such evidence would have been enthusiastically received 
by one and all as indicating the fruitfulness and the predictive power of tradi­
tional formulations.  Thus the auxiliary hypothesis which restricts the predic­
tive range of the traditional theory to market phenomena is an ex post amend­
ment to the theory; furthermore,  it is not an amendment that suggests a  new 
range of testability for the theory as amended,  but one that rules out tests con­
sidered ex ante to be appropriate.  The introduction of auxiliary hypotheses of 
this type is not the path to a  cumulative increase in knowledge. 2 
1.  The pOSition just set forth is my own reading of Friedman~ which is cer­
tainly not the only possible one.  As compared with the recent discussion by 
Professors Nagel,  Simon,  and Samuelson (E. Nagel,  "Assumptions in Economic 
Theory," and discussion by P. Samuelson and H. Simon,  American Economic Re­
view,  Vol. 53 (May 1963),  pp. 211-19,  229-231,  231-36 respectively),  it is more 
charitable in that it does not involve the following charges:  (1) That he fails to 
understand that the assumption of profit maximization implies itself (see Fried­
man,  .£E.  cit.,  p. 28).  (2)  That he commits a  logical error by arguing that when 
A implies B,  and B  is found to be true,  A is true (1  take him to mean only that 
the truth of B  leads us to "accept" the hypothesis A  in the usual statistical sense 
of .. cannot reject hypothesis A on the evidence B").  (3)  That he  cling~ to A even 
though it is known to be false,  on the ground that it successfully predicts Band 
that makes it useful,  though false.  (This is one possible reading; my own is that  tory
A  cannot be shown to be false because it has no empirical counterpart; a third is 
city, that the alleged evidence against A is by no means conclUSive.) 
3.  F,
2.  See Karl R. Popper,  The Logic of Scientific Discovery (English edition; New  jecti1
York:  Basic Books, Inc.,  1959), especially Section 20, on the question of the ad­ Anal1, missibility of auxiliary hypotheses.  Also, the following quotation (p. 42) is curi­
(Septl
ously apropos:  "According to my proposal,  what characterizes the empirical  Amel 
method is its manner of exposing to falsification, in every conceivable way, the 
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But even if Friedman's methodological essay had antedated the studies 
which produced the evidence he dismissed as irrelevant,  his position would 
still be of dubious validity.  For,  as Friedman correctly stated,  the possible 
~d 	 hypotheses consistent with any given collection of observed facts are infinite 
in number,  and for the choice among the hypotheses consistent with the facts 
the criteria are" simplicity"  and "fruitfulness."1  A theory "is more 'fruitful' 
the more precise the resulting prediction,  the wider the area within which the 
theory yields predictions,  and the more additional lines for further research 
it suggests." 2  It can hardly be argued that the addition of an auxiliary hypoth­
il  esis providing a  narrower definition of the" class of phenomena the theory is 
designed to explain" is a  step in the direction of greater fruitfulness,  though 
it may well be necessary for consistency with the observed facts.  We would 
certainly prefer a theory which predicted the market behavior of firms and 
ld  the results of direct study of their decision processes to one which predicted 
.s. 	 only the former; furthermore.  this wider range of prediction would increase 
st 	 our confidence in the ability of the theory to predict market behavior in new 
situations.  Thus the auxiliary hypothesis needed to make the theory consis­
tent with the evidence relating to the internal workings of firms can at best be 
ed  viewed as a temporary expedient which should be indulged in for the shortest 
possible length of time.  Friedman,  however,  gives the impression of being 
prepared to indulge in it indefinitely. 
The second type of defense of the profit maximization assumption to 
be considered here is that which argues that any modifications in the theory 
)0- of the firm necessitated by evidence on their internal workings (or any other 
Jf  eVidence) can and should be made without dropping the assumption of profit 
maximization.  In one extreme formulation,  this view simply involves a 
blanket assertion of willingness to make the necessary modifications,  so that 
any and all behavior could be "explained" by imputing to decision makers the 
beliefs which would make their actual choices profit maximizing ones.  This 
view reduces the assumption of profit maximization to a tautology,  which of 
mic 	 course deprives it of any refutable implications.3  There is a  very faint but 
~  Re­ still noticeable family resemblance between this extreme view and the implicit 
nore 
to 
led­ system to be tested.  Its aim is not to save the lives of untenable systems
'hen  but, on the contrary, to select the one which is by comparison the fittest. by
at  exposing them all to the fiercest struggle for survival." 
ense 
even 	 1.  Friedman,.2l!. cit.,  p. 10. 
md  2.  Loc. cit.  Friedman's definition of"  Simplicity" is rather less satisfac­
: that  tory than his definition of fruitfulness.  On the problem of defining" Simpli­
rd is  city," cf. Popper, .2l!.  cit.,  chap. vii. 
3.  Professor Machlup advanced something very close to this extreme sub­
New  jectivist position in the" Lester-Machlup debate" of 1946-47.  See "Marginal
ad­ Analysis and Empirical Research,"  American Economic Review,  Vol. 36 
uri­ (September 1946).  pp. 519--554.  Also," Rejoinder to an Antimarginalist," 
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further 
or explicit rationale of much of the theoretical work of recent years,  work  obtained 
which achieves ever more complex statements and/or solutions of the maximi­
zation problem assumed to confront the firm:  If  the firm has imperfect knowl­
edge of the consequences of its actions, some subjective probabilities and a 
utility function over the various probability mixtures of outcomes must be im­
puted to it. If its actions at one point in time affect the alternatives open to it at 
a later time, sequential deciSion theory is called for. If it produces a large num­
ber of products with large numbers of fixed and variable inputs, some linear or 
non-linear programming model is appropriate.  And so on.! 
Much of the theoretical work of this type can be readily defended on the 
grounds of its present or possible future usefulness in the normative economics 
of the firm, i.e., in management science or operations research applications. 
But to the extent that such models are offered as a  contribution to positive eco­
nomics, they often have major defects.  The most elaborate of them are still 
drastic oversimplifications of the decision problems facing the larger firms in 
the real world, but at the same time the problem of estimation they present to 
an economist actually interested in predicting the behavior of one or more firms 
is overwhelming.  Indeed, many such models incorporate as basic data represen­
tations of the beliefs or goals of the decision makers which are indeterminable 
in practice, if not in principle.  Finally, it is frequently the case that the model 
has so many parameters to be estimated as to make further simplifying assump­
tions a  practical necessity, with the result that the apparent benefits from a  more 
"realistic" statement of the problem are lost. 
C.  What Difference Does It Make? 
If there is a  real issue involved in the controversy over the assumption of 
profit maximization, it assuredly does not center on the question of whether the 
assumption is consistent with observed fact.  For, taken by itself, the assumption 
does not yield any predictions about behavior,2 and thus the assumption itself can­
not possibly be refuted by any observation.  Refutable propositions result only when 
the assumption is supplemented by some characterization of the decision problem 
the firm is assumed to face, and of the constraints on its solution to that problem. 
Even when such a  characterization is provided, the predictions that can be made 
without quantitative information on the problem the firm faces are meagre.  3  Still 
1.  Examples of theoretical contributions of this type are so abundant that citation 
of any of them would necessarily involve an unintended invidious comparison with  clusions s 
in princip' the others. 
economistj
2. It might be regarded as being fundamentally an assumption about motivation, in  clear that 1 
which case it would yield predictions about behavior in response to interview ques­ tion of thej
tions about motivation-at least, it would if the interview were conducted with the  principle.
help of a  polygraph.  But, by itself, it yields no conclusions about actual economic 
behavior, whether it is valid as an assumption about motivation or not.  2.  The CUI 
search at C 
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further assumptions must be made if such quantitative information is to be 
obtained,  since real world counterparts must be found for more of the enti­
ties in the theory.  At anyone of these stages,  a determined defender of the 
profit maximization assumption will genera11y be able to find,  if necessary, 
a  "mistake" which may account for the fact that the predictions of the theory 
were not confirmed.  In fact,  the search for the" mistake" is guaranteed of 
success at the level of the characterization of constraints on the firm,  since 
any behavior at a11  may be rationalized as profit maximizing if enough sub­
jective or objective constraints are imposed to make the observed behavior 
the only "feasible" behavior. 
However,  there is an important issue involved in the controversy, and 
that question is one of research strategy.  There can be no doubt that,  in spite 
of repeated expressions of skepticism from reputable economists about the de­
sirability of anchoring the theory of the firm to the assumption of profit maxi­
mization,  the further elaboration of the implications of that assumption is al­
most universally acknowledged to be a legitimate objective of theoretical in­
quiry-with only the slightest reservations being expressed if the results are 
obviously without implications that can in factI be subjected to test.  On the 
other hand,  tentative attempts to find different foundations for the theory of 
the firm-whether utility maximization,  satisficing,  or whatever-are invari­
ably met by a  query as to whether the new approach rea11y yields the wide 
range of interesting conclusions that the profit maximization assumption does. 
Considering the comparative amounts of effort invested in investigating the im­
plications of profit maximization as against any alternative approach, it is not 
surprising that the answer must be "no."  However,  it is precisely the desir­
ability of this allocation of effort which is fundamentally at issue.  The ques­
tion is whether the large intellectual vested interest that the profession has in 
the assumption of profit maximization should be further increased by a  contin­
uing to allocate the major share of research effort to elaborating its implica­
tions,  or whether it is time to give more encouragement to steps which might 
eventually permit the profession to diversify its theoretical portfolio some­
what. 2 
This question,  of course,  can only be directed to the entire social 
process by which the directions of economic research are determined,  and 
therefore it is directed to no one in particular.  It is an interesting and im­
portant question,  nevertheless. 
1.  It  would obviously be undesirable to reject as empty all theoretical con­
clusions save those which are testable in fact.  If the conclusion is testable 
in principle,  there is always the possibility that some empirically-oriented 
economist will figure out a way to perform the test.  Nevertheless,  it seems 
clear that the progress of the science would be more rapid if a large propor­
tion of the theoretical conclusions were testable in fact rather than merely in 
principle. 
2.  The current trend is toward a  more diversified approach,  with the re­
search at Carnegie Institute of Technology on the "behavioral theory of the 
firm" being particularly worthy of mention. 
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D.  The Scope of the Present Study 	 This 
In the context of the dispute over the assumption of profit maximiza­
tion,  there are several benefits that may be derived from a  systematic exam­
ination of the validity and significance of the selection argument.  First, there 
are the considerations which always justify an attempt at more rigorous for­
mulation of an apparently plausible argument:  The intuitive appeal of the ar­
gument may be deceptive,  in which case the attempt to put it on firmer foun­
dations will reveal the error,  and,  in addition,  a  clearer understanding may 
be achieved of the assumptions (if theyexist) required to establish the propo­
sition in question.  Secondly,  even if it should prove to be the case that the 
selection argument provides little support to any particular theory of the firm, 
it is nevertheless true that an assumption that in the long run firms must avoid 
negative profits in order to survive must,  in conjunction with other assumptions 
not relating to the decision rules of firms,  have ~ implications as to the 
types of behavior that will prove viable.  It should be interesting to learn what 
those implications are.  Finally,  it may be that analysis of the requirements 
for viability can mediate among the contending schools of thought with respect 
to the theory of the firm,  justifying the use of the profit maximizing model for 
certain classes of problems,  but showing that certain details of the actual de­
cision making processes of firms may be controlling of the outcome in other 
circumstances. 
In Section II of this paper,  certain ambiguities in existing formulations 
of the selection argument are discussed,  and a  particular unambiguous formu­
lation of the argument is then subjected to systematic criticism.  In Section 
III,  a  general formal model of economic selection processes is presented.  A 
Simple specific model,  in which the only decisions taken by firms relate to 
output policy in the short run and to expansion policy, is analyzed in Section 
IV,  and some of the conclusions of this analysis are then extended to a  more 
general model.  Section V  consists largely of speculations about the results 
parti that might be obtained from investigation of more complicated,  and less 
tifica mathematically tractable,  models.  Some concluding remarks are made in 
ship Section VI. 
tions 
II. 	PROFIT  MAXIMIZATION  AND  ECONOMIC 

SELECTION:  A CRITIQUE 

A.  Theories of the Firm and Theories of Entry and Exit 
A discussion of the support that the selection argument affords to the 
traditional theory of the firm is not a  discussion of facts,  but of the theories 
used to explain and predict facts.  As was explained in the previous section, 
some auxiliary hypotheSiS or other can always be introduced to protect the 
basic assumption of profit maximization from inconvenient facts relating to 
firm decision making procedures or anything else.  The question to be exam­
ined now is whether this procedure is likely to be fruitful-whether the selec­
tion argument provides assurance that the protected theory will be fruitful  verifi 
and have a  wide range of applications in which it needs no ad hoc protection.  J. B. 
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This question cannot be settled by appeal to any facts,  since by definition the 
"fruitfulness" of a theory relates to its probable future successes rather than 
to its consistency with a limited body of existing evidence. 
If this question cannot be settled by appeal to facts,  how can it be set­
tled?  Perhaps it cannot be finally settled,  but it can at least be clarified.  If 
opinions on the matter must ultimately rest on intuitions rather than knowledge 
of reality, it is still possible to recast the question into terms which will make 
the relevance of the intuitions more evident.  In this paper,  such clarification 
is sought from an approach which may be likened to that of sampling theory in 
statistics.  The individual statistician confronting his sample data wants to 
know what inference he should draw from it.  The one strictly correct answer 
to this question depends on the characteristics of the population,  which,  how­
ever,  are unknown.  But some guidance as to what may constitute reasonable 
,s 	
procedure in the face of this uncertainty can be obtained by hypothesizing more 
information about the population than is in fact available-e.g., that it is nor­
mally distributed with a  certain mean and standard deviation.  The results that 
would be obtained under repeated random sampling from such a  population have 
been determined,  and these results afford a  standard of comparison for the ac­
tual sample results.  Similarly, the discussion below hypothesizes a  certain 
model of the real world and of the process of theorizing about it.  In the con­
text of this model one can then examine the question of what theoretical ap­
proaches would be fruitful-in particular, whether the probable fruitfulness of 
theories based on the assumption of profit maximization is enhanced by selec­
tion considerations.  As in the case of sampling theory,  the usefulness of the 
guidance obtained from this model is contingent upon the validity of the model, 
but the model itself is not subject to conclusive test. 
The basic concepts in this abstract model of the problem of theorizing 
about the firm are as follows: 
A firm is an entity with at least two permanent characteristics,  (1) a 
particular organization form,  and (2)  an institutional identity-a name or iden­
tification number.  The term organization form refers to a  functional relation­
ship between the state of the world (exhaustively described) and the firm' s~­
Hons.  This relationship may be broken down into two stages,  (1)  an informa­
tion-acquiring stage,  in which the informa ',ion available to the firm is deter­
mined as a  function of the state of the world,  and (2) an action-taking stage in 
which the firm' s  action is determined as a  function of the information available 
to it and of the firm's internal state. 
A theory of the firm is a  theory, hich yields refutable predictions of 
the behavior (actions) of particular firms or aggregates of firms; the predic­
tions are generally conditional in the sense that they predict the behavior that 
will be observed given that certain states of the world obtain. 1  Thus a  theory 
1.  In the ensuing discussion,  I  ignore the question of whether there exists in 
the economic literature a  theory that is a  theory of the firm in the sense here 
defined; I  simply assume that this is the case.  Actually,  I  tend to concur in 
Papandreou' s  view that economic theorists do not produce genuine theories, 
i.e., theories which will pass a  falsifiability test of meaning as opposed to a 
verifiability test.  See A.  G. Papandreou,  Economics as a Science (New York: 
J. 	 B.  Lippincott Co.,  1958). 
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of the firm il:l  at least a partial characterization of the organization form of 
firms; by indicating the behavior to be expected under particular circumstances 
it rules out certain possible functional connections between circumstances and 
behavior.  A  theory of entry and exit yields refutable predictions relating to the 
appearance and disappearance of firms; Le., to the appearance and disappear­
ance of institutional identities paired with particular organization forms.  For 
example,  such a theory may make conditional or unconditional statements about 
the organization forms of firms which come into existence,  and about the states 
of those firms (described by balance sheets,  number of employees,  etc.) when 
created.  Or it may set" forth the conditions under which firms will or will not 
disappear-the conditions for failure or survival.! 
The distinction between a theory of the firm and a theory of entry and 
exit is not traditionally made in economic theory.  The reason is that econo­
mists have generally concerned themselves with investigating the implications 
of profit maximization in various contexts,  and that assumption serves both as 
the explicit basis of the traditional theory of the firm and as an implicit theory 
of entry and exit.  Since the assumption is made directly with respect to all 
firms,  no question arises of distinguishing the subset of firms to which the 
theory of the firm relates from the set of firms in existence.  However,  al­
most any departure from the traditional style of theorizing about firm behav­
ior immediately raises this question.  A theory of decision making in large 
corporations,  or a  model of the decision processes of the manager of a de­
partment store,  is a theory of the firm in the sense defined above,  but it does 
not purport to characterize all of the firms in existence,  or even to explain why 
firms with the particular decision processes the theory describes happen to ex­
ist in the economy.  A  theory of the behavior of large automobile firms need not 
be deduced from any universal motivational assumptions; it may be a  concise 
explanation of certain observed regularities in the behavior of General Motors, 
Ford and Chrysler. 
The distinction between a theory of the firm and a  theory of entry and 
exit is particularly crucial to the understanding of the selection argument. 
Essentially,  Alchian2 suggests that instead of deducing their conclusions from 
a  universal characterization of all firms which appear in the economy,  econ­
omists should concern themselves with the implications that can be drawn 
from a  simple characterization of the firms which do not disappear-namely, 
that they do not consistently make negative profits.  The emphasis in the the­
ory of entry and exit should be 'put on exit rather than entry.  Alchian further 
suggests that this amendment to the theory of entry and exit restricts but does 
not eliminate the usefulness of the traditional theory of the firm.  In particular, 
2. the traditional theory should correctly predict the change in the behavior of 
hi~ 
an; 
thll 1. 	 It is useful to consider entry and exit together because the disappearance 
saJ of one or more firms (as the word "firm" is understood here) is often asso­
wii ciated with the appearance of a  new firm or firms,  as in the case of mergers 
or complete turnovers in management.  ma 
3,
2.  2£. cit. 
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aggregates of firms that will occur as a  result of a  change in their common 
economic environment.  The traditional analysis should not be regarded as a 
tool for predicting the behavior of any individual firms,  but rather for deter­
mining the types of behavior that will become more (or less) viable as a  re­
sult of a  given change in the environment-and thus for predicting the change 
in the characteristics of the set of surviving firms that a given change in the 
environment will produce. 
Whereas Alchian stops short of asserting that the selection argument 
lends support to the use of the traditional theory for predicting the behavior 
of particular firms under given conditions,! Friedman's discussion suggests 
that he is willing to take this additional step.  That is,  Friedman appears to 
argue that,  at least in the long run,  the behavior of survivors must actually 
be profit maximizing behavior.  2  However,  neither author actually offers any 
general statement setting the limits within which the traditional theory is con­
sidered to be adequately supported by selection considerations.  The absence 
of such a  statement reflects the existence of the ambiguities in the selection 
argument that are discussed below. 
B.  Difficulties and Ambiguities in the Selection Argument 
In the writings of the proponents of the selection argument,  there is 
no suggestion that the support afforded to the traditional theory may depend 
critically on the particular types of non-maximizing behavior exhibited by 
firms.  In fact, the existence of such a limitation is explicitly denied: 
Let the apparent immediate determinant of business behavior be any­
thing at all-habitual reaction,  random chance,  or whatnot.  Whenever 
this determinant happens to lead to behavior consistent with rational 
and informed maximization of returns,  the business will prosper and 
acquire resources with which to expand; whenever it does not,  the 
business will tend to lose resources and can be kept in existence only 
by the addition of resources from outside. 3 
The objection to this sweeping statement is that the process of prosper­
ing and acquiring resources with which to expand does not occur instantaneously; 
some time is required for the greater profitability of firms that approach maxi­
mizing behavior to be reflected in a  Significantly larger relative importance of 
1.  Ibid.,  p. 218.  He also emphasized this pOint in his comment on the Pen­
rose article (Alchian,  Enke,  Penrose, ~. cit.). 
2.  Friedman,~. cit.  This interpretation is consistent, in particular,  with 
his use of the billiard player analogy.  He is willing to predict the behavior of 
an expert billiard player with a theory which assumes that the player can solve 
the mathematical problems posed to him on the billiard table.  Similarly,  he 
says,  he is willing to predict firm behavior (of firms that survive a long time) 
with a theory which assumes that they can actually solve the problem of profit 
maximization. 
3.  Friedman,~. cit.,  p. 22. 
i 
j
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those firms in the economy.  If the immediate determinants of behavior are 
"habitual reaction,  random chance,  or whatnot," there is no reason to believe 
that the firms which take actions consistent with profit maximization at one 
time will also take actions consistent with such maximization at all subsequent 
times; hence,  there is no obvious reason to believe that there will be any ~­
~ tendency for the firms which are maximizing profits at any given time to 
grow relative to firms which are not maximizing. 
Suppose first that all firm behavior is random in the sense that deci­
sions are made at random in each time period.  There can be no tendency for 
the market to • select" 'Profit maximizing firms for survival,  for the simple 
reason that there are no consistent profit maximizers to be selected. If there 
is selection at all under these circumstances,  it must be selection of firms 
with probability distributions of behavior that,  in the actual cumulative proc­
ess,  prove to be viable.  It is quite obvious that traditional economic theory 
is not an appropriate tool for predicting the behavior of the surviving firms, 
either individually or in the aggregate. 
Alternatively,  suppose that "habitual reaction" is the actual determi­
nant of firm behavior.  If the habitual reactions of some firms at a particular 
time are consistent with profit maximization,  and if as a consequence these 
firms expand relative to other firms in the economy,  this very fact will tend 
to alter the market price environment facing all firms.  It is not clear why, 
in this altered environment,  the same firms should continue to have the good 
fortune to be closer to maximizing behavior than their competitors. 
There is,  then,  a basic difficulty in the existing statements of the se­
lection argument,  a  difficulty which is rooted in the fact that the relative devi­
ations from profit maximization of different firms may change through time. 
Since there has been no careful treatment of the dynamic process by which 
some patterns of behavior are shown to be viable and others nonviable, it has 
escaped notice that firms cannot in general be unambiguously ranked in terms 
of their closeness to maximizing behavior.  Such a  ranking must,  in general, 
presume a particular state of the environment,  but the environment is changed 
by the dynamic process itself.1 
des4 
I. It is the absence of any analysis of the dynamic process by which firms that  be I 
are close to maximizing behavior drive out firms which are far from it that large­
ly vitiates the analysis of the selection argument by G. Becker <.2E,.  cit.).  His as­
sumption that irrational firms choose an output level that results in nonnegative 
1.. profits is purely gratUitous; the situation is further confused by his referring to 
per, the range of output levels which give nonnegative profits as an "opportunity set." 
wag. (He is correctly criticized on this score by 1. Kirzner ("Rejoinder," Journal of Po­
tive litical Economy, Vol. 71  (February 1963), pp. 84-85.) Irrational firms are perfectly 
prof free, in the short run, to choose output levels outside of this"  opportunity set." If 
iner something prevents them from persisting in this behavior in the long run, it can 
tive only be that this course of action leads to bankruptcy.  The process by which a 
sur, group of irrational firms can interact in the market place so as to drive some of 
tioru them out of business is crucial to the argument, and Becker provides no elucida­
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This difficulty in the writings of Alchian and Friedman is closely re­
lated to the fact that they do not distinguish between actions and organization 
forms and it is not clear on which the selection process is thought to operate. 
Alchian's treatment seems to emphasize selection of actions rather than or­
ganization forms,  and this interpretation is consistent with the emphasis he 
places on the meaninglessness of profit maximization as a  guide to behavior 
when choices are made under uncertainty.  In an example chosen to illustrate 
the selection mechanism in its purest form,  he postulates a  situation in which 
every firm maintains its labor-capital ratio in the face of a rise in the real 
wage rate.  Firms with high labor-capital ratios will be relatively worse off 
after the rise than before; hence their chances for survival and growth will be 
lower and the characteristics of the set of surviving firms shift in the direc­
tion of a lower labor-capital ratio.  1  Thus he appears to be thinking in terms 
of persistence in a  particular action in the face of changing conditions.  Al­
though elements of imitative behavior and purposive behavior are introduced 
as supplements to the selection element in Alchian's view of economic real­
ity,  there is no extension of the selection argument itself to cover the case of 
systematic changes in the firm's actions as the environment changes.  Fried­
man's position on this matter is less clear,  but his use of the term"  habitual 
reaction" might be regarded as an indication that the selection process is 
thought to operate on something more than individual actions.  The word re­
action suggests reaction to a  range of different market situations. 
Whatever the intention of the two authors,  the distinction between ac­
tions and organization forms is crucial to the relationship between the selec 
tion argument and the traditional theory of the firm.  If the selection process 
could be shown to operate effectively on organization forms,  the support af­
forded to the traditional theory would be very strong indeed.  Subject to the 
condition that there exist some firms with profit maximizing organization 
forms,  and that the continuing creation of firms with non-maximizing organi­
zation forms be negligible,  essentially the entire structure of the traditional 
theory would then be upheld by selection considerations.  In particular, the 
conclusions of the standard comparative statical analyses of economic theory 
would be supported,  and the sort of informal dynamics by which economists 
describe the response of firms to the appearance of profit opportunities would 
!  be relevant. 
! -.I  Alternatively,  if the selection process is thought of as operating on 
1.  Alchian,.QE.. cit.,  p. 214.  It is worth noting that,  if some firms react 
perversely to a higher wage rate,  Alchian's argument can fail.  A rise in the 
wage rate may increase the minimum labor-capital ratio at which non-nega­ ~- ;1' 
tive profits can be made (although it decreases the ratio at which maximum y 
,  J 	 profits are made).  All firms might be at this minimum value initially,  and 
increase their labor-capital ratios sufficiently to continue to make non-nega­
tive profits after the wage rise occurs.  So the characteristics of the set of 
surviving firms would shift in a  direction opposite to that predicted by tradi­
tional theory.  This illustrates the importance of setting some limits on the 
types of irrationality that are considered possible. 
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actions,  then the conclusions of the selection argument presumably relate to 
the actions that are taken in long run equilibrium.  Even if the argument in 
that form were found to be valid,  the fruitfulness of traditional theory would 
be very limited.  1  For example,  the implications of a  change in some tax 
rate might be incorrectly predicted by ordinary comparative static analysis, 
since the responses of firms to the new situations would not necessarily be 
profit maximizing even if their actions in the initial equilibrium were profit 
maximizing.  Of course,  a theory of entry and exit might be advanced which 
would predict that new firms would appear which would take the appropriate 
actions under the new conditions.  That theory is not itself supported by the 
selection argument,  and in any case the adjustment process envisaged is dras­
tically different from that contemplated in traditional theory. 
In brief,  the existing formulations of the selection argument lack an ex­
pliCit analysis of the dynamic process by which viability is tested,  and the dis­
tinction between actions and organization forms is not clearly made.  As a  re­
sult of these deficiencies,  the extent of the support afforded to the traditional 
theory of the firm is left uncertain. 
C.  Selection of Organization Forms:  Some Necessary Conditions 
The remainder of this section consists of an informal examination of 
some of the assumptions required to establish a particular version of the se­
lection argument,  a  version that is sufficiently closely specified to be free of 
the ambiguities noted above.  The argument is as follows:  Consider a world 
of perfect and costless information in which firms have given production func­
tions and can instantaneously make the usual short run adjustments to market 
conditions.  Suppose,  for simplicity,  that all firms neglect any influence that 
their own purchases and sales may have on market prices; i.e., that all behave 
competitively.  Assume that entry and exit are governed by the following sUp­
1.  As Professor Simon has observed,  much of the interest in the "behavioral 
theory of the firm"  and other attempts to provide a more "realistic" theory of 
firm behavior lies precisely in the need to predict behavior in situations other 
than those of equilibrium in a  static environment.  He draws an analogy with 
the problem of theorizing about the pOSition of a liquid in a  bowl of irregular 
shape:  If the bowl (the environment) is held steady,  relatively little has to be 
known about the liquid to predict its behavior in equilibrium.  But if  the bowl 
is continuously shaken,  or if it is desired to describe the path to equilibrium, 
much more knowledge of the liquid (Le., its viSCOSity) is required.  He takes  t 
the analogy further by suggesting that even prediction of the equilibrium posi­
tion of the liquid requires considerable knowledge of its behavior if it is sub­
ject to forces other than gravity (multiple motivations).  It may be taken still 
further by noting that the bowl may not be entirely rigid and its shape may 
therefore be interdependent with the character of the liquid-the actions of one 
firm help to shape the environment of others.  See H. A. Simon,  "Theories of 
Decision Making in Economics,"  American Economic Review,  Vol. 49 (June 
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to  ulations:  At an initial time to there are many firms in the economy,  of which 
some large number have profit maximizing organization forms in the sense 
lId  that in every market situation they make the short run response that a profit 
maximizing competitive firm of traditional theory would make,  while some 
,is,  other firms have organization forms which are not profit maximizing in this 
Ie  sense.  Any firms that are created after time to have profit maximizing or­
fit  ganization forms.  For each firm there is a  finite limit on the cumulative loss 
lch 
n 
that it can incur without going out of business and permanently disappearing 
lte  from the economy.  The conclusion to be established is that,  as time passes, 
the firms with profit maximizing organization forms will account for a  share he 
dras­ of the transactions in every market that approaches one in the limit; conse­
quently,  the error in the predictions of traditional economic theory with re­
spect to the short run market behavior of firms in the aggregate will become an ex­
e dis­ arbitrarily small. 
The situation postulated is one in which short run profit maximization a re­
is meaningful; it has been assumed that some firms actually are profit maxi­ onal 
mizers'  that firms adhere to particular organization forms rather than be­
having randomly,  and that there is no disruptive entry of non-maximizers into 
the picture.  Each of these assumptions is needed if the conclusion is to hold­
but several other assumptions of economic interest are needed as well. 
1 of  For example,  suppose that several firms,  including some maximizers 
, se­ and some non-maximizers,  have identical production functions but those pro­
~e of  duction functions are not characterized by constant returns to scale.  If  there 
Jrld  are increasing returns to scale,  it could happen that a  non-maximizer has an 
func­ initial scale advantage over all the maximizers.  Provided his departure from 
arket  maximization is not too severe,  the scale advantage may more than compen­
that  sate for it.  If the greater profitability of the non-maximizer then induces a 
.ehave  higher growth rate,  the scale advantage of the non-maximizer will become 
stip­ still larger,  and none of the assumptions made thus far provide any reason to 
think that the maximizers will ever catch up.  Alternatively,  suppose that re­
turns to scale are diminishing.  Then the maximizer will run into less favor­
'ioral  able production conditions as it expands relative to non-maximizers,  and at 
)ryof  some point the difference in returns to scale may compensate for the differ­
other  ence in short run decision making skill.  In this case,  apparently,  the possi­
.vith  bility arises that maximizers and non-maximizers may coexist indefinitely
lllar  simply because the maximizers cannot expand enough to put lethal market 
to be  pressure! on the non-maximizers. 2 
bowl  Maximizers and non-maximizers may also coexist if they produce
:ium,  different products,  or if they produce identical products,  but the non-maxi­
akes 
posi­
sub­ 1.  By "market pressure" I  mean the tendency of one firm (or group of firms) 
still  to drive down the product prices and/or drive up the factor prices facing an­
loy  other firm (or group of firms). 
Jf one 
2.  However,  if maximizers could create independent subsidiaries which were .es of 
une  also maximizers,  diminishing returns to scale would not limit the market 
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mizers have some technologically-based cost advantage.  In the former case, 
a  non-maximizer facing a  downward-sloping demand curve may be held to a 
small scale by competition from maximizers producing less-than-perfect sub­
stitutes for its product,  but will not necessarily be eliminated from the econ­
omy.  In the latter case,  the non-maximizer might eliminate its maximizing 
competitors from the economy,  if there were constant or increaSing returns 
to scale.  Or it might reach an equilibrium sharing of the market with them. 
Thus it appears that the conclusion of the argument stated above is 
generally valid only if returns to scale are constant and all non-maximizers 
suffer competition from maximizers producing identical products under cost 
conditions that are at least as favorable. 
Another necessary condition is that differential profit-ability must 
lead to differential growth rates of maximizers relative to non-maximizers. 
That is,  the maximizers must not be content merely to payout their extra 
profits in higher dividends while remaining at the same scale,  nor can they 
insist on Some· fair rate of return" from investment in expanded facilities, 
if  that rate is higher than the normal rate.  For if the maximizers adhered 
to such poliCies,  the non-maximizers would not necessarily come under suf­
ficient market pressure to put them out of business.  The assumption that the 
maximizers follow the proper expansion policy is obviously independent of the 
assumptions with respect to short run profit maximization.  It is not unknown 
for the owners of highly profitable firms to show no interest in expansion. 
Still further assumptions must be introduced to assure that a combina­
tion of financial strength in the non-maximizers and special initial conditions 
does not lead to an early disappearance of the maximizers from the economy. 
Suppose that a  number of maximizers and non-maximizers produce a partic­
ular product and have identical constant returns production functions.  If the 
total scale of all the firms taken together is sufficiently large, market price 
may be so low for some period of time that none of the firms make profits. If 
the non-maximizers can afford to take very large losses without going out of 
business,  while the maximizers cannot,  the result may be that the maximiz­
ers disappear before price rises to the point where they would break even.  A 
somewhat Similar difficulty would arise if the assumption of competitive behav­
ior were dropped; non-maximizers might engage in a policy of price war,  de­
liberately driving the maximizers out of business. 
Finally,  nothing in the assumptions identified thus far guarantees that 
those market situations in which the non-maximizers depart from profit maxi­
mization actually occur'! or occur for a  sufficiently long period to result in 
the demise of the non-maximizers.  To see this problem in its clearest form, 
suppose that in the absence of the non-maximizers the economy would reach a 
certain competitive equilibrium position.  Assume further that,  faced with the 
particular set of prices associated with this equilibrium,  the non-maximizers 







1.  Note that a  firm is not a profit maximizer according to the definition given  of set
above if in ~ market situations it does not maximize profits.  A non-maxi­ functi
mizer may maximize profits in some,  but not all,  market situations. 
= 
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conditions might place the economy in this competitive equilibrium,  with 
some of the non-maximizers taking the places of maximizers and taking the 
identical actions.  Since the economy will not depart from this equilibrium, 
no behavior that is not profit maximizing will be observed.  Although tradi­
tional economic theory" explains" the characteristics of the equilibrium,  it 
will not correctly predict the results of some parametric change in such an 
economy; a parametric change may displace the equilibrium to a  position 
where the non-maximizers do depart from maximizing behavior.  Under less 
special assumptions,  the circumstances may occur in which the non-maximiz­
ers actually do not maximize,  but these circumstances may be transitory and 
the non-maximizers survive nevertheless. 
The assumptions required to establish some version of the argument 
other than that set forth might not be as stringent.  In an alternative version, 
the conclusions might relate only to the actions taken in the ultimate equilib­
rium of the system,  or the maximizers might be held to dominate the economy 
in some less stringent sense than that postulated above.  It is clear, neverthe­
less,  that something more than a wave of the hand is needed to establish the 
scope and degree of the support that selection considerations afford to tradi­
tional theory.  The problem is complex enough to make formal,  rigorous anay­
ysis a virtual necessity if crucial assumptions are not to remain implicit. 
III.  A  GENERAL  FRAMEWORK 
A.  Basic Concepts 
The discussion in the previous section points to the need for an explicit 
formal framework within which one may investigate the general question of the 
constraints on firm behavior imposed by a  requirement for long term survival. 
A fully general framework might describe the dynamic processes of growth, 
decline,  and interaction of firms in terms of mixed systems of difference and 
differential equations; it might admit the possibility of random elements in 
firm decision making and in the exogenous variables influencing the economy; 
it would certainly provide some formal representation of the matters treated 
by a theory of entry and exit-the conditions under which firms are created or 
disappear,  the processes by which organization forms are determined,  and so 
forth.  In the interests of Simplicity,  the framework presented below is quite 
special by comparison with such a  general model.  It is,  nevertheless,  so 
general that in the absence of additional assumptions it implies very little in 
the way of interesting results.  Some indications of the directions in which the 
model may be further specialized are given in subsection C,  and Section IV 
treats some specific models. 
The following notational principles are adhered to:  Capital letters (A, 
X, W,  F) denote sets; corresponding small letters (a, x, w,  f)  refer to elements 
of sets,  Functions are represented by small Greek letters (a, 11,  <p).  When a 
function is written without its argument,  it is the function itself (Le., the func­
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tional form) which is under consideration,  not the value of the function.  The 
subscript j -on  a  set or an element of a  set indicates that that set or element 
is associated with firm j.  Some of the sets considered are sets of possible 
states of an entity; in this case a  small letter subscripted with the letter t  de­
notes the state of that entity occurring at time t.  The notation (X, Y) is used 
for the Cartesian product of the set X  and the set Y,  Le., for the set of all 
pairs (x, y).  x  EX,  Y E Y. 
At each of a  sequence of discrete times  t = 0,  1, ...  ,  a  state of the 
world Xt occurs,  where Xt is an element of a set X  of possible states of the 
world.  The state of the world is partially described by describing the states 
of the  m  firms; this is assumed to be accomplished by a vector of p  real 
valued firm state variables.  Examples of firm state variables might be plant 
and equipment owned,  the entries in the firm's balance sheet,  its records of 
past decisions made,  and so forth.  Denote the vector of firm j's state vari­
ables by fjt, (j = 1, ..• ,m),  and the set of possible state vectors by F j .  The 
remainder of the job of describing the state of the world is done by a vector 
of real valued external variables.  The list of external variables includes the 
prices in all markets in which any of the firms deal; it may also include such 
things as tax rates and the state of the weather.  Denote the n-vector of ex­
ternal variables by Wt.  Then 
(1)  Xt  =(fit, ..•  ,  fmt' wt) =(ft, Wt) 
is a  vector in n + mp dimensional real space,  and X is a set of such vectors. 
The decision processes of the  m  firms are characterized in much the 
same way as in the economic theory of teams,  developed by J. Marschak and 
R. Radner. 1  The first stage in the decision process of a firm is an informa­
tion gathering stage; firm  j  obtains at time t  some information y.t about the 
state of the world,  where Yjt is an element of a  set Yj  of possible ~utcomes of 
the information  gathering  activities of firm j.  The message Yjt is a  func­
tion 71j  of the state of the world at time t: 
(2)  Yjt  = 71j  (Xt)  j  = 1, ...  ,  m 
The function 71j  is called the information structure of firm j.  The second 
stage in the decision process is the choice of an action ajt from the set Aj of 
possible actions of firm j.  The choice of an action is constrained,  however, 
by the firm's state.  The ordered pair (ajt,  fjt) must lie in a  certain relation 
1. 	 See J. Marschak, .£E..  cit.  Among the earlier articles in this field are 
J. Marschak,  "Elements for a Theory of Teams," Management Science, Vo1.1 
(January 1955),  pp. 127-137; and R. Radner,  "The Linear Team:  An Example 
of Linear Programming Under Uncertainty,"  in Proceedings of the 2nd Sym­
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Rj on (~, Fj)'  1  The action taken by a  firm j  depends both on its state and on 
the information available to it,  in a  manner described by the rule of action, 
elf 
(3) 	 ajt = elj  (Yjt'  fjt) 
The ordered pair (el·, 71j)  is called the organization form of firm  j, and 
is denoted by CPj'  The set ot possible organization forms for firm  j  is OJ.  The 
ordered set of possible organization forms for the  m  firms is Q  = (Ql' 
Om)' 
The state of the world changes through time in' a  manner that depends in 
part on the actions of firms.  It is convenient,  for present purposes,  to treat 
this dynamic process as a  first order difference equation: 
(4) 	 xt+l = 1/1 (Xt,  at, t) 
where,  of course,  at = (a  ... ,a  t) is the vector of actions taken by the  m 




argum~t of the function 1/1  because it is interest­
ing,  in some specific models,  to examine the implications of changes through 
time in such things as consumer preferences and the actions of government. 
These influences are subsumed,  otherwise,  in the form of the function 1/1. 
The vector function 1/1  is assumed to have the following special proper­
ties.  First,  external variables are not influenced by the states of firms ex­
cept insofar as the latter influence the actions of firms: 
(5) 	 Xt+l  = 1/Iw  (Wt,  ~, t) 
ft+l  =1/If  (Xt,  at, t) 
Secondly,  for every firm  j  there is a  nonempty subset O. of the set of possi­
ble values of its vector of state variables such that whenJfjt  E  OJ  firm  j  is 
"out of business."  The sets OJ  are related to the function  lJ;r;  whenever 
fjt E OJ  the function lJ;r yields a  vector fj,t+1  E OJ- That is,  once a  firm is 
"out of business" it is "out of business"  permanently.  Furthermore,  all of 
the possible organization forms for the firm  j  have the property that fjt E OJ 
implies elj (Yjt, fjt) =aj' where aj is a  constant "null" action of firm  j. 
The actions of all firms depend,  by way of their organization forms, 
on the state of the world.  Therefore,  once the organization forms of all firms 
and an initial state of the world Xo  are specified,  the equations (5)  determine 
the changes in the state of the world through time. 
1.  The set Aj will be considered to be a  set of vectors in some finite dimen­
sional real space.  The relation Rj may be defined, in particular, by the pro­
duction technology open to the firm.  That is,  the state variables may include 
the firm's plant,  equipment and inventories; the firm's actions may be quanti­
ties bought and sold; the relationRj indicates how the buying and selling oppor­
tunities of the firm are limited by its plant,  equipment and inventories and by 
the conditions of production in the firm. 
2.  Each of the ajt may itself be a  vector,  as noted previously. 
247 # 
SIDNEY  G.  WINTER,  JR. 
B.  The General Problem of Economic Selection Theory 
The theoretical issues raised by Alchian and Friedman are special 
cases of a  more general theoretical problem:  What constraints on the behav­
ior of a  firm are implied by a  requirement that it be able to survive in the long 
run?  More precisely,  what combinations of organization forms of firms can 
coexist in the economy in the long run,  given the technological and institutional 
conditions under which the firms interact and the definition of failure provided 
by given bankruptcy laws?  Or,  in formal terms:  Given some interesting 
specification of the function 1/1,  a  set Xo of pOSsible initial conditions,  and a 
subset QI  of the set Q  of possible organization forms for the  m  firms,  what 
I 
II 
characteristics distinguish the set of organization forms of firms that play a  ~ 
non-negligible role in the economy as  t  goes to infinity from the set of organi­
zation forms of firms that are of vanishingly small importance? 
The selection argument put forward by Alchian and Friedman states 
that the distinguishing characteristic of a viable organization form is that it 
is in some sense a  profit maximizing organization form.  The preceding sec­
tion provides examples of combinations of initial conditions and sets of pOSSi­
ble organization forms for which this conclusion is not valid.  These examples 
do not,  however,  demonstrate that the conclusion is invalid for all specifica­
tions of 1/1,  Xo  and Q'.  Neither do they show that theorists of firm behavior 
have nothing to learn from a  consideration of the conditions for viability in the 
long run.  These are the questions that remain to be investigated. 
C.  Further Specification of the Model:  Some Difficulties 
Several difficulties are immediately encountered as one attempts to 
investigate the general problem of economic selection theory.  At the formal 
level, it is a  simple matter to introduce additional assumptions which will 
eliminate the difficulties,  and such assumptions are in fact introduced in the 
specific models treated in Section IV.  However,  these difficulties are not 
purely formal; the assumptions which eliminate them also eliminate the the­
oretical counterparts of phenomena which obviOUSly exist in the real world. 
Therefore,  it seems advisable to discuss the difficulties and some of the al­
ternative ways in which they might be handled in the theory. 
The first of the difficulties is that,  given a function 1/1  and a particular 
selection !/l  = (!/lI, ... , !/lm)  of an organization form for each firm,  the sur­
vival or failure of a  firm may depend on the initial conditions xo.  For exam­
ple,  survival may depend on the initial financial strength of the firm,  as was 
suggested in the preceding section.  Since the focus of economic selection 
theory is on the characterization of viable organization forms,  the realiza­ • 
tion that firm survival does not depend on organization forms alone is some­ ~ 
what annoying.  Nevertheless,  it is clear that in reality.  firms which could  t 
survive in the economic environment of time t  and later sometimes fail be­
fore time  t  arrives'! 
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For present purposes, it is convenient to specify the dynamic process 
in such a way as to rule out this possibility of "transient failures".  In the 
models of Section IV,  this is accomplished by assuming that there is a limit 
to the percentage rate at which firms can decline in scale,  and that firms are 
"out of business" only when they have scale zero.  Thus,  all firms that are 
"in business" initially remain so indefinitely.  It is necessary to distinguish 
of course,  the survival of a  firm from the viability of an organization form. 
A firm survives if it does not go out of bUSiness; an organization form is vi­
able if firms with that organization form account for a  non-negligible fraction 
of economic activity as  t  becomes arbitrarily large. 
More sophisticated models might admit the possibility of transient 
failures and the possibility of entry of new firms.  In such models,  the failure 
of all firms with a  given organization form would not necessarily mean the 
permanent disappearance of that organization form,  since it might be .. re­
incarnated" in newly entering firms at a  later date.  This would mean,  how­
ever,  that an organization form could be viable in the sense defined above even 
if all firms displaying that organization form tended to earn negative profits­
there might be continuing entry of new firms with that organization form and 
with positive net worth.  In general,  the conclusions of the analysis could re­
late only to the shares of total activity accounted for by firms of greater or 
lesser life expectancy.  Such conclusions might be of interest if there were a 
strong empirical basis for the particular modeling of the economy chosen,  but 
in the absence of such a basis the conclusions would be hard to translate into 
guidance for the theorist of firm behavior. 
A second difficulty that arises as the attempt is made to formulate spe­
cific models lies in the definition of the conditions under which a  firm goes out 
of business.  Recall that,  under the assumptions made above,  the organization 
form is a permanent characteristic of a  firm.  If the organization form asso­
ciated with a particular institutional identity undergoes a  change,  this should 
be regarded as a  case of one firm's going out of business and being replaced 
by another.  At the formal level there is no difficulty in providing a  definition 
of failure which has the essential property that a firm cannot operate at a loss 
indefinitely without failing.  In the real world,  however,  changes in basic firm 
policies-which might be interpreted as changes in organizatton form-often 
occur when the firm still has a large positive net worth; indeed,  such changes 
sometimes occur when the firm is making profits.  It is,  for example,  tempt­
ing to interpret a  challenge to the control of the management of a  corporation 
as involving a  demand for a  change in organization form.  At least, it is cer­
tain that challengers with precisely this objective would appear if a  success­
ful giant corporation were suddenly to display a  systematic tendency toward 
negative earnings,  and references to the remaining strength of the corpora­
tion's balance sheet would afford very little protection to the challenged man­
agement. 
In short,  the institutional processes which are the real world counter­
part of the definition of failure in a  selection model cannot be described merely 
in terms of negative net worth and the bankruptcy laws.  Ideally,  the formula­
tion of the selection model should reflect this fact,  but it could do so only if it 
249 I 
SIDNEY  G.  WINTER,  JR. 
also reflected the possibility of transient failures and of continuous entry of 
new firms.  As was noted previously,  the introduction of these complications 
would generally mean that the model would yield little in the way of qualitative 
conclusions.  In any case, this step must be left to the future. 
D.  Organization Forms,  Behavioral Assumptions,  and Learning 
Among the possible organization forms that might be considered in a 
selection model are some which implicitly attribute to decision makers a  cer­
tain structuring of the decision problem they face and a  certain objective.  For 
example,  the objective may be maximum profits,  and the structuring of the 
problem may involve a  subjective demand curve considered to be facing the 
firm,  or an assumption that rival firms will hold price or quantity constant, 
or an assumption that next period's prices will be the same as this period's. 
Whenever the attempt is made to deduce behavior from assumptions to the ef­
fect that decision makers act as if they believe so-and-so and are trying to ac­
complish such-and-such,  the problem of learning arises:  If  experience does 
not bear out the assumptions on which decision makers are presumed to act, 
is it reasonable to assume that they continue to act on those assumptions? 
This problem is,  of course,  familiar to economists.  It has attracted partic­
ular attention in connection with certain Simple models of behavior under con­
ditions of oligopoly,  such as the Cournot,  Bertrand and Edgeworth solutions.l 
In the context of economic selection theory,  the fact that organization 
forms are treated as part of the exogenous data of the economic system puts 
the learning problem in a  novel perspective.  The premise of selection anal­
ysis is that actual firm responses to given market situations cannot neces­
sarily be deduced from the assumptions on which economists have generally 
relied,  and the objective is to determine the ultimate implications of a wider 
variety of behavioral assumptions.  If  learning phenomena are important in a 
certain real world situation,  then a  useful selection model of the situation will 
reflect this fact in the organization forms imputed to firms.  2  However,  the 
question of whether certain learning phenomena are important is a  question 
about decision processes,  not a  -iuestion about objective market conditions. It 
can only be answered by an investigation of what the particular firms observe, 
what inferences they draw from these observations,  and how they translate 
these inferences into action. 
In the models introduced below,  it is assumed that all firms respond 
only to current price in making their output decisions.  This does not rule out 
the possibility that some firms behave as if they faced a  certain downward 
sloping demand curve,  but it does rule out the possibility that a  firm acquires 
1.  See the discussion by William Fellner, 2£. cit.,  chap. ii; and,  more re­
cently,  W. J. Baumel, 2£. cit.,  chap. iii. 
2.  However,  the incorporation of any particular learning process merely pushes 
the learning problem back a  stage.  The learning process itself will be described 
in terms of .. as if" assumptions which need not be validated by experience. 
250 
...i YALE  ECONOMIC  ESSAYS 
over time additional information on (changing) elasticity of the demand curve 
facing it.  It therefore precludes as well situations in which a  firm "notices" 
that,  with the passage of time,  it has become a monopolist,  and starts to act 
accordingly.  While the reader is free to quarrel with this departure from 
"realism" in these very simple organization forms,  it must be recognized 
that the quarrel is with the particular specification of the organization forms, 
and not with the baSic assumption that organization forms are unalterable 
characteristics of firms.  Without this basic assumption,  there can be no 
theory of selection. 1 
#0 
IV.  SOME  SPECIFIC  MODELS 
A.  Selection of Output Determination and Expansion Rules in a  Single Market 
The first example of an economic selection process to be examined 
here is a differential equation model of a  selection process operating on out­
put determination and expansion rules for firms producing the same homo­
geneous product and selling in the same market.  A single state variable de­
scribes the state of each firm; that variable is the firm's  denoted by fj 
(j  = 1, ... , m).  A  single external variable,  w,  is treated explicitly; it is the 
market price of the product the firms produce.  Prices of current inputs and 
of additions to scale are assumed to be constant (the supply curves to the in­
dustry are infinitely elastic).  and are not treated explicitly.  Firms take two 
types o~ decisions; they choose an output rate,  aj'  and a  rate of change of 
2 scale,  fj . These decisions are based,  at each point of time,  on perfect in­
formation as to the value of w.  Organization forms are scale free,  i.e., the 
scale of the firm may be factored out.  Thus (with a  slight modification of the 
notation of the preceding section) the rules of action may be written as follows: 
(1)  aj  = aj (w) fj 
fj  =1/Ij (w)  fj 
At this pOint,  only a  general characterization of the set of pOSsible 
rules of action is needed.  The functions aj are differentiable,  nonnegative, 
nondecreasing,  and bounded.  The functions 1/Ij  are differentiable and bounded 
below.  Also,  for each  j  there is a  number Wj  > 0  (called the  ~ zero growth 
~ 
1.  One of the objections that Mrs. Penrose raised against Alchian's formu­
lation of the selection argument can be interpreted as an objection to the ab­
# 	 sence of some such assumption.  She argued that the natural selection analogy 
is weak because  there  is  no  economic  analogue  for  hereditary traits,  and 
thus nothing on which the selection process can operate.  See Penrose, 
es  ,2P. 
~d  2.  For notational consistency with the general model,  the two actions should 
be labeled a~ and a?  However,  the present notation is less cumbersome. 
J  J 
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price" for firm  j) such that t/lj (Wj)  = 0; t/lj (Wj)  > 0; w  > Wj  implies t/lj (w) > 0, 
and W < Wj  implies t/lj (w) < O.  That is,  there is a  value of the market price 
above which firm  j  will expand and below which it will not.  It is assumed 
that aj (Wj)  > O.  Firm  j  is "out of business" if fj  = 0,  but by virtue of the 
boundedness of t/lj there can be no transient failures. 
The rate of change of the market price is governed by excess demand: 
(2) 	 w"'  <5  (w) - z.;  aj 
J 
1 Here,  of course,  <5  (w)  is the market demand curve. The function  <5  is as­
sumed to be nonnegative and differentiable for all positive w,  with a  strictly 
negative derivative.  It is also assumed that  <5  (w) ....  (Xl  as w  ....  0,  and that,  for 
some wO sufficiently large <5  (wO)  "  O. 
Substituting the expression for aj given in (1) above into equation (2), 
the following system of differential equations in the state of the world variables 
is obtained: 
(3)  Vi  = li (w)  -	 ~ a j (w) fj 
J 

f  "  t/Ij (w) fj  (j  = 1, .  .  .  , m) 

The set of initial conditions to be considered is that in which all m  + 1 varia­
bles are given positive values,  and wo < wO. 
A  selection eq~ilib,rium for t~e system (3) is a  set of values w,  ~  for  w 
and the fj's such that w  "  fl  "'  •.. = fm "  0,  and t/lj  (Vi) so for all j.  It is the 
latter condition that distinguishes a  selection equilibrium from any other equi­
libriu~ of the system.  The possibility that some firms have 1j  =0  (thus satis­
fying fj  "  0) and t/lj (Vi) > 0 is ruled out.  That is,  in selection equilibrium it is 
not merely the case that the scale of each firm is constant,  but price is at a 
level which by itself makes positive growth impossible for all firms,  regard­
less of whether their scales are positive or zero.  It may happen,  of course, 
that t/lj (w)  < 0  in selection equilibrium for some firms; such firms must have 
zero scale and their organization forms are nonviable in selection equilibrium. 
Gi.ven initial conditions in which all firm scales are positive,  the sys­
tem (3) cannot approach any equilibrium which is not a  selection equilibrium. 
The scale of a  firm that would have a  positive growth rate at the price Vi  cannot 
approach zero asymptotically as w  approaches w,  for the functions t/lj  are  as­







1.  I  do not bother with multiplying the excess demand by an adjustment coeffi­
cient, since this can always be made equal to one by an appropriate normaliza­
tion. 
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(4) 	 W =Min w, 

j  J 

fj  = 0  for all  j  for which Wj  > w 
13  indeterminate for all other j, but 
~a, (W)fj  = 6 (W) 
j  J 
For,  at any price w  above W,  some firm  j  has a  positive 1/t, (w); on the other 
hand,  at prices below W all of the 1/tj (w)  are negative,  so fj J=  0  implies 
fj =0  for all j.  This,  however. is mconsistent with equilibrium in the out­
put market,  since wO > W. 
to 
If it starts from initial conditions in which all firm scales are positive, 
the system (3) cannot approach any equilibrium which is not a  selection equi­
librium.  The only possible equilibria which are not selection equilibria are 
those for which 1/tj {W)  > 0 for some firm  j.  Equilibrium requires 1j  = O.  hence 
it must be that r=  0,  but a firm cannot make an asymptotic approacll to zero 
scale as w  tends to Vi  if it would have a  pOSitive growth rate at W.  There­
fore,  if the system approaches equilibrium at all,  it must approach a  selec­
tion equilibrium. 
The conditions for viability in any possible equilibrium of the system 
have now been characterized.  Those organization forms which have the low­
est zero growth price are viable,  others are not.  Or,  to put the matter an­
other way,  price will tend to the lowest value at which some firm's organiza­
tion form still yields nonnegative growth.  Firms whose organization forms 
result in decline at that price will approach zero scale as time goes on,  leav­
ing the firms which have the minimum zero growth price to share the market. 
While having the rtHnimum zero growth price is a necessary condition 
for viability of an organization form in this model,  the discussion thus far 
does not establish that it is a  sufficient condition.  The transient behavior of 
the selection process,  as well as its asymptotic behavior,  could be relevant 
to viability if the approach to equilibrium were sufficiently slow,  And if the 
behavior it yields in disequilibrium states of the system is relevant to the 
viability of an organization form,  characteristics other than the zero growth 
price may be involved in the sufficient conditions for viability. 
It happens that the question of whether there is "selection by the 
transient" in systems of this type is intimately connected with the question 
of local stability.  Therefore, the first step in the analySiS of selection by 
the transient is to linearize the system (3) around some selection equilib­
rium.  There is a  slight difficulty in carrying out this linearization,  for se­
lection equilibrium is nonunique with respect to the division of the market 
among viable firms,  hence the system can at best be in neutral equilibrium 
with respect to this division.  However,  the conclusions of the analySiS that 
follows hold regardless of the particular choice of positive 1j values for via­
ble firms,  provided of course that the assigned values satisfy the condition 
for e~uilibrium in the output market,  Le.  ~ a, (w) f '  = 6 (Vi).  The linearized  .  J  J 
system is: 	 J 
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(5) 	 w  =[6 
1  (W)  - f:aj (w)~1 (w  W)  - ~ aj(W) (fj  - fj) 
J  J  .  -,  -	 ­
fj =  fj 1/Ij  (W)  (w - w)  + 1/Ij (W)  (fj - fj) 
(for  j  =  I, ...  ,  m) 
Suppose that there are  s  firms with organization forms that are non­
viable in the equilibrium,  i.e., for which 1j  = 0.1  Let the firms be renumbered 
so that these are firms I, ... ,s.  Since 1/Ij (W) =0  and 1j > 0 for firms s  + 1 
to m,  and 1/1' (W)  < 0  for firms 1 to s,  the matrix of the linear system is seen 
to have the following pattern of signs:  (a)  The first row is nonpositive,  and 
the first element and elements s  + 2 through m  + 1 are strictly negative; 2 
(b)  Rows 2 through s  + 1 are zero except for the diagonal element,  which is 
negative;  (c)  Rows s + 2 through m  + 1 are zero except for the first element, 
which is positive.  It is easily shown that zero is an (m - s  1)  - fold charac­
teristic root of such a  matrix,  and that the remaining roots have negative real 
part.  Furthermore,  there are (m  s  - 1) independent characteristic vectors 
associated with the characteristic root zero,  and in each of them the first ele­
ment is zero.3 
Since the only characteristic vectors with non-zero first elements are 
those associated with roots with negative real part the linear system is stable 
with respect to w.4  This means that the original system is at least locally 
stable with respect to w.  It further means that if the quantity (w - w) approaches 
zero at all,  it approaches essentially like eAt,  or perhaps  t  eAt,  where  A is al­
gebraically the largest of the real parts of the negative characteristic roots. 
Finally.  since integrals like r  eAt dt  and  J"'t eAt dt  are absolutely convergent 
t*  t* 
when A < O.  the integral J'" (w - w) dt is also absolutely convergent if w  ap­
t* 
proaches the equilibrium value was a  limit.  Here,  t* may be thought of as 
being chosen "large enough"  so that w  is "close" to  w  and the linear approx­
ir.1ation is relevant.  Since.  however,  no question of convergence arises for 
Mi 1.  The number of nonviable firms may be anything from 0 to m  - 1. 
we 
2.  Recall that 6' < Oa j 2: 0,  and aj (Wj)  > O. 
3.  See Sidney G. Winter, Jr.,  "Economic "Natural Selection" and the Theory  (7: 

of the Firm"  (unpublished doctoral dissertation,  Graduate School,  Yale Uni­

verSity,  1963).  Appendix.  i.E 

4.  For given initial conditions.  the solution of the linear system for 
(8
(Wt  - w)  consists of a linear combination of terms of the form zn eAit,  where 
Ai  is a  characteristic root of the matrix and zn is the first element of the as­ Fe
sociated characteristic vector (assuming that there are m  + 1 linearly inde­
t2 
pendent  characteristic vectors).  Hence if the  zn  are nonzero only  for 
vectorS  associated with  characteristic  roots with  negative  real part,  the 
V~ 
system is stable in Wt. 
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approximation establishes the absolute convergence of the improper integral 
f'" (w - Vi) dt. 
o 
To summarize the argument to this point:  If  the initial conditions are 
such that the system eventually reaches a  small neighborhood of some selec­
tion equilibrium,  then a linearized system like (5) approximates the further 
course of the system.  The linear analysis reveals the system to be locally 
stable in w,  and an incidental corollary of this fact is that the" discrepancy 
integral,"  fa> (w - w) dt,  converges. 
o 
~  It will now be shown that the foregoing result implies that there is no 
selection by the transient in this model.  Consider any firm with an organiza­
tion form that is viable in the equilibrium,  Le.,  a  firm for which Wj  = W.  For­
mally integrating the equation for this firm's growth rate in the system (3), we 
find: 
(6) 	 log fj  = log f.O + ft lJI (w)  dt 

J  0 

If  the integral on the right converges as  t  goes to infinity (specifically, if it 
does not go to minus infinity),  then the limiting value of fj is not zero,  and all 
of the "transient" behavior of the system is comparable to the initial conditions 
in its effect on the qualitative properties of the asymptotic behavior of the sys­
tem. 
That this integral does in fact converge is an instance of the following 
theorem:  Let x(t) be bounded and Riemann integrable on every finite interval, 
for t2: O.  Let z(t)  y  [x(t)J,  where y  is continuous on the range of x,  yeO)  =  0, 
and y  satisfies a  Lipschitz condition at x =O. 
Theorem:  If f""x(t) dt is absolutely convergent,  then f"" z(t) dt is likewise ab-
O  0 
solutely convergent.  Proof:  The integrability and boundedness of  x  on every 
finite interval,  together with the continuity of y,  imply the integrability of z 
on every finite interval.  The Lipschitz condition asserts that there exists an 
M > 0 and a  neighborhood of x =0  such that whenever  x  is in this neighborhood, 
we have 
(7)  Iy (x) - y  (0) I <  M  Ix - 0 I 
i.e., 
(8) 	 Iy  (x) I <  M  Ix  I 
For some t*,  x(t) will be in the appropriate neighborhood of x =0 for all 

t2: t*.  1'1.  comparison test establishes the conclusion. 

The application of this theorem is immediate.  Make the change of 
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biUty of l/Ij implies that the Lipschitz condition is satisfied.  We  conclude that 
there is no selection by the transient in this model,  i.e.,  Wj  = Vi is in fact a 
necessary and sufficient condition for viability,  given initial conditions in 
which all firm scales are positive.  Attention must now be focused on the de­
terminants of the zero growth price.  The interpretation given below is only 
one of several that are possible,  but it is perhaps the most interesting from 
the point of view of the insight it affords into the relationship between selec­
tion and profit maximization. 
Assume that all  m  firms have identical constant returns to scale pro­
duction functions,  and that they use identical,  cost minimizing techniques to 
produce any given level of output with any given scale of plant.  Further,  as­
sume that all firms have similar expansion policies at least to the following 
extent:  They will expand if an only if their current gross profit per unit 
scale exceeds the fixed cost per unit scale; the latter comprises depreciation 
and a  "normal return." 
On these assumptions,  differences in the zero growth price among 
firms are traceable only to differences in current profitability.  The lowest 
price at which gross profit per unit scale equals fixed costs per unit scale is 
the zero growth price.  Hence,  the lowest possible zero growth price is that 
familiar quantity,  the minimum of short run average total cost.  (On the as­
sumptions made,  this quantity is independent of scale and is also the mini­
mum of long run average total cost.)  This will be the zero growth price of 
any organization form which yields the profit maximizing output level as the 
response to this price,  and any organization form which yields a  different 
output level at this price must necessarily have a  higher zero growth price. 
The conclusions of the analysis may be stated in terms of the fami­
liar cost curve diagram of economic theory.  The zero growth price of an 
organization form is the price at which the graph of the rule of action re­
lating output to price intersects the average total cost curve.  In Figure 1, 
the graphs of six such rules of action are shown in relation to the short run 
average total cost curve,  which is assumed to be the same for all firms.1 
(Both the cost curve and the rules of action are" per unit scale", Le., they 
are drawn for fj = 1 for all firms.)  Firms 1,  2 and 3 all have the lowest 
possible zero growth price,  since their rules of action all pass through the 
minimum of the ATe curve.  If the system approaches an equilibrium as  t 
goes to infinity,  that equilibrium will be the ordinary competitive equilibrium. 
The fraction of output produced by firms like 4, 5 and 6,  which do not maxi­
mize profits in that equilibrium,  will approach zero. 
Suppose however,  that the only organization forms in the economy are 
those displayed by firms 4,  5 and 6.  Then the selection equilibrium price 
will be w4'  and firms with the higher zero growth price w5 =w6 will disappear 
1.  Note that marginal cost is assumed to be increasing throughout.  If  the 
curve were initially decreasing,  the profit maximizing rule would have a  dis­
continuity.  The admission of discontinuities in the rules of action would com­
plicate the argument. 
w  ­ 5 
w 
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Figure 1. 
from the economy.  The surviving firms,  with rules of action like (Y4 (w), will 
be making zero profits at a price which could yield positive profits. 
The fact that there is no selection by the transient means that,  if the 
system approaches an equilibrium,  the selection process will not discriminate 
between the rule of action (Yl (w)-which yields the profit maximizing output at 
every price-and any other rule of action which also passes through the mini­
n. 	 mum of the cost curve.  In particular,  the rule a2(w)-which always calls for 
producing the output at which average total costs are minimized-will be as vi­
able as any.  Note also that a  vague concept of "closeness" to profit maximiz­
ing behavior may be misleading.  It might be argued,  for example,  that the 
rule a 4 (w) is "closer" to being profit maximizing than the crude" rule of 
!ar  thumb",  a 2 (w).  But (Y 2 (w) is viable and (Y 4 (w) is not,  because (Y 2 (w)  coin­
cides with the profit maximizing rule at the one price level that counts. 
Since the selection process provides only a weak discrimination among 
organization forms in this model,  the use of ordinary comparative statics 
analysis to predict the implications of parametric changes is not justified by 
selection considerations.  To take a  simple example,  suppose the system is 
1- approaching a  selection equilibrium,  not necessarily the ordinary competi­
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analysis predicts that the system will move toward a lower equilibrium price. 
However,  selection considerations alone do not exclude the possibility that the 
cost of scale is a  parameter of the output determination rules-e.g., lower 
fixed costs might lead firms to produce more,  per unit scale,  at every price. 
If  the rules of action shift with the cost change,  the new intersections with the 
new cost curve may be higher than the old equilibrium price,  so the selection 
equilibrium price may move in the opposite direction from the competitive 
equilibrium price. 
This simple model illustrates,  therefore,  one of the important objec­
tions to the selection argument that was noted in Section II.  If the argument 
is understood as stating that only profit maximizing organization forms are 
viable-and it must state this if it is to afford significant support to most of 
existing theory-then it is necessary to ask why the variation in the state of 
the world should be large enough and persist long enough to discriminate be­
tween a  profit maximizing organization form and one which merely coincides 
with it over some restricted range of situations. 
It seems clear,  of course,  that the introduction of time as a  parame­
ter of the demand curve could increase the discrimination of the selection 
process.  If  the asymptotic behavior of the system involved a  repeated fluc­
tuation of price over a  finite range,  then one would expect that the viable or­
ganization forms would be those that were profit maximizing within that 
range (assuming the existence of some profit maximizing firms).  (For ex­
ample,  a persistent fluctuation in the demand curve might make the rule 
0!2(w) in Figure 1 nonviable,  while O!l(w) and 0!3(w) would still be viable.) 
The question would still arise:  What about responses to prices outside the 
range of past variation?  A  suffiCiently large parametric change would carry 
the system outside of that range,  and the predictions of traditional theory 
would again be without support from the selection argument.  Analogous, but 
more interesting,  questions arise in models in which the information available 
to firms is imperfect and costly.  For,  as will be suggested in Section V,  un­
der these conditions simple "rule of thumb"  decision processes may be more 
viable than processes which conform closely to the image of the firm in tradi­
tional theory.  The selection process may discriminate against those firms  nd 
that would approach profit maximizing behavior over a  wide range of situa­ lir 
tions,  and in favor of those which happen,  by virtue of their rules of thumb,  H(
to achieve profit maximization in a  restricted range of situations.  se 
B.  A Scale Free Selection Model with Several Markets  ne 
The model just presented has the great virtue of yielding a  simple and  ell 
understandable characterization of a viable organization form.  Unfortunately, 
such a  characterization is very difficult to achieve in models of only margin­
ally greater complexity.  To emphasize this point,  I  now consider a model  1. 
which is basically similar to that just presented,  but which involves  n  mar­ si 
kets instead of one.  th 
I  retain the assumptions that organization forms are scale free and  a 
that scale (or physical capital) is a  one dimensional quantity and is in infi­ 2.
nitely elastic supply to all firms.  The symbol  w  is now interpreted as an  n  Ii 
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element column vector of prices of outputs and current inputs,  and a· (w)  is 
an  n  element column vector of outputs sold (+) and current inputs boJght (-) 
by firm j,  per unit scale.  Let a (w) denote the row vector (al (w), ...  , 
am (w»,  or,  to put it another way,  the  n  x  m  matrix of current inputs and 
outputs,  per unit scale,  for all firms.  The function I) (w) is now a  column 
vector demand function,  and Some components are negative at appropriate 
prices.  Let  f  be the column vector of firm scales,  and 'Ii be the  m  x  m 
diagonal matrix with elements 1/11 (w), ...  ,  I/Im (w) on the diagonal.  It is 
assumed that I/Ij (w)  < 0 for all nonnegative vectors tn a  neighborhood of 
w  :=  0  (because of the fixed costs,  which are not considered explicitly).  The 
functions I/Ij  are continuous.  The dynamic system is: 1 
(9)  w  I) (w)  a (w) f 
f  'Ii (w) f 
A selection equilibrium is defined,  as before,  as a  situation in which 
there is no change in prices or firm scales,  and no I/Ij  is positive.  There is, 
however,  no simple way of characterizing the possible selection equilibria in 
this model.  Indeed,  it is not obvious that such equilibria need exist.  Consider 
the case where there is only one firm.  In the single market model,  a  nontrivial 
selection equilibrium is clearly possible provided only that the firm's zero 
growth price is less than wO,  for the scale of the firm can be chosen so that 
supply and demand are equated at the firm's zero growth price.  When there 
are  n  markets to be considered,  however,  adjustments in a  single variable, 
the firm's scale,  will not in general suffice to establish equilibrium in all the 
markets simultaneously.  More precisely,  the fact that a firm may have a 
positive growth rate at the prices wO such that I) (wO)  =  0 does not imply that 
there exist prices Vi  such that (a) the firm's growth rate is zero,  and (b) for 
some choice of the firm's scale,  the firm's input and output decisions are con­
sistent with the market demand I) (W).  Nor is the situation greatly improved 
by admitting a  number of firms equal to the number of markets,  in view of the 
nonnegativity constraints on firm scales and the absence of any guarantee of 
linear independence in the firms' action vectors at any particular set of prices. 
However,  it can be shown that if certain additional conditions are imposed,  a 
selection equilibrium must exist.  2 
In the single market model,  the interactions among firms are strictly 
negative in the sense that a  change in the organization form of a firm which 
enhances its viability (reduces the zero growth price) has if anything an adverse 
1.  Actually,  a  slight qualification to this system is needed to rule out the pos­
sibility that prices become negative.  The qualification merely stipulates that 
the system (9) governs a  price that has reached zero only if it does not call for 
a further decrease,  and that the price will stay at zero otherwise. 
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effect on the viability of other organization forms.  When there are several 
markets,  the possibility of positive interactions arises.  The viabiUty of a 
firm's organization form may be enhanced when the organization forms of its 
suppliers are improved in certain ways,  just as it might benefit from shifts 
in their production functions.  Or a firm may depend for its existence on some 
particular departure from profit maximization in another firm,  e.g.,  a prac­
tice of purchasing inputs which could be produced within the firm at a lower 
cost.  Provided that this particular unprofitable practice is not eliminated, 
the firm supplying the inputs may benefit from any change which enhances the 
viability of its customer. 
These examples illustrate the point that the viability of an organization 
form cannot in general be determined without reference to the entire system 
of organization forms in the economy.  The most general question that can be 
asked of a  particular selection process is whether certain combinations of 
organization forms can persist in the economy,  or whether they will tend to 
give way to new organization forms.  It is the ecological concepts of succes­
sional and climax ecosystems,  rather than the simple notion of" survival of 
the fittest,"  that provide the appropriate biological analogy. 
I will not attempt here to meet the challenge of providing an analysis 
of the several market model which treats these" ecological"  features of the 
problem.  Instead,  I will treat the simplest cases where a  .. survival of the 
fittest"  concept can be applied,  Le., where it is apparent that the presence of 
one organization form in the economy renders another nonviable.  Although 
the remarks that follow are of very narrow applicability,  they do seem to cap­
ture the element of validity in the simple observation that a firm which is 
"close to maximizing behavior" will tend to survive at the expense of one that 
is not so .. close. " 
Assume henceforth that,  given initial conditions in which all firm 
scales are positive,  the existence and uniqueness of a  solution to the differ­
ential equation system (9) is assured.  Furthermore,  assume that for given 
initial conditions the time paths of wand f  are known to be bounded.  I 
state first a  relationship between the viability of an organization form and the 
time path of w(t).  Let R"  {w  II/Ik (w)  < I/Ij (w)}.  Suppose that R  is nonempty, 
and assume further that w(t)  E R  for all but a finite period and that w(t) E R' , a 
compact subset of R,  for an infinite period.  Then the organization form of 
firm  k  is nonviable.  For clearly,  over the compact set R I  there is a  positive .  . 
minimum to the difference I/Ij  (w) - I/Ik  (w);  hence.!:i exceeds fk  by at least some 
fj  fk 
positive quantity for an infinite period,  while the growth rate of firm  j  is less 
than that of firm  k  for at most a  finite period.  Thus,  to assert that fk does 
not approach zero is to assert that fj  approaches infinity,  contrary to the 
boundedness assumption.  This result handles the simple cases where identi­
cal production possibilities are open to  j  and  k,  growth occurs if and only if 
1  there are positive net profits,  and firm  j  is a  profit maximizer while  k  de-
I  parts from profit maximization in some range of situations.  The other side of 
the coin is that any difference in the behavior of j  and k  in regions of the price 
1  space where w(t) spends only a  finite time is irrelevant to the viability comparison. 
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A sharper result can be given if it is known that the system approaches 
a selection equilibrium.  Let Gj '"  {w  Il/Ij (w) :5.:  O},  and Gk
:=  {w  Il/Ik(W) < O}. 
IfGj C  Gk, then the organization form of firm  k  is nonviable.  For let W be a 
le 	 compact set in the price space such that w(t) E W  for all t.  (Recall that wIt) is 
assumed to be bounded.)  The selection equilibrium price vector must lie in the 
compact set Gj  n W,  and over this compact set there is a  maximum of l/Ik (w). 
Since the maximizing w  is in Gj ,  it is also in Gk, and the maximum must be 
e 
negative.  Therefore,  as the system approaches selection equilibrium,  fk must 
undergo negative exponential growth. m 
As in the Simple model,  therefore,  we find that if the system approaches 
a  selection equilibrium it is the ability of the organization form to yield positive 
growth in a wide range of price environments that determines its viability.  Note, 
however,  that the limits of this range of environments cannot be expressed as a 
single price,  but are expressed instead as some locus in the price space.  Since 
.the particular point of the price space at which the system will settle cannot be 
determined without determining the solution of the whole system, it is only in 
the special case where the entire set Gj  is included in the set Gkthat the non­
viability of k  can be established with ease. 
If  two firms have identical sets of possible organization forms,  and 
identical expansion policies as expressed by the functions l/Ij'  then it may be 
possible to determine the comparative viability of the two organization forms 
)- by examining the extent to which they approach profit maximization in short 
period production decisions.  If,  however,  one firm is closer to maximizing 
behavior at one set of prices,  and another at another,  then viability turns on 
the behavior of the rest of the system.  Furthermore, if  the system is known 
to approach a  selection equilibrium,  then it is known that closeness to profit 
maximizing behavior is relevant only to the extent that the range of environ­




V.  SPECULATIONS 
'e 
A.  The Implications of Imperfect and Costly Information 
e 
The models of the previous section indicate that conclusions of some 
theoretical interest can be obtained by analytical methods when the selection s 
process under investigation is sufficiently Simple.  Clearly,  there is a long 
list of problems in economic selection theory that could be formulated as 
questions about the behavior of relatively simple systems of difference or 
differential equations.  Many of these problems might well be amenable to 
analytical treatment.  In this paper,  however,  the primary objective is to 
discover the implications of the selection mechanism for the theory of the ,f 
firm.  Therefore,  rather than press forward with the task of subjecting sim­
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that might be involved in more complicated and realistic bystems,  and sug­
gest the implications of such systems for the theory of the firm. 
Since so much of the discussion of the assumption of profit maximiza­
tion has focused on the information and computation requirements of maxi­
mization,  it is appropriate to consider first the implications for economic 
selection processes of imperfect and costly information.  The simple single 
market process considered in the previous section will serve to illustrate 
a  fundamental problem.  Suppose that,  instead of being free to adjust produc­
tion instantaneously to perfect and costless information on the current price, 
firms must base their production deciSions on the market price at some time 
prior to the time that output appears.  Let the cost of a  firm's information 
structure be a  decreasing function of the difference between the time at which 
price is observed and the time at which the output based on that price infor­
mation is forthcoming; Le.,  more up-to-date information is more costly.  As­
sume further that a  firm which pays no attention to price has no information 
costs.  Finally,  let the firms have identical production functions,  and expan­
sion policies which depend in an identical way on gross profits. 
If  the system approaches a  selection equilibrium at a  sufficiently 
rapid rate,  so that there is no selection by the tranSient,  the following con­
clusion emerges:  A firm with an organization form which calls for producing 
the output which minimizes average total costs,  and ignoring price entirely, 
will be viable in the selection equilibrium,  while the organization form of a 
firm which obtains price information and then chooses a  profit maximizing 
output decision on the basis of that information will not be viable.  For when 
the price is constant at the level of average total costs (excluding information 
costs),  the firms produce the same output,  but the firm which buys informa­
tion will have lower profits and will decline.  Similarly, if  there are no firms 
which ignore price,  the organization forms which yield the most out-of-date 
information will be the viable ones,  since their information costs will be 
lower. 
It does not pay,  in terms of viability or of realized profits,  to pay a 
price for information on unchanging aspects of the environment.  It does not 
so, pay to review constantly decisions which require no review.  These precepts 
do not merely imply that information costs must he considered in the defini­
of tion of profits.  For without observing the environment,  or reviewing the 

decision,  there is no way of knowing whether the environment is changing, 
m~ 

tio  or the decision requires review.  It might be argued that a  determined profit 
maximizer would adopt the organization form which calls for observing those 
COl 
things that it is profitable to observe at the times when it is profitable to ob­ at 
he  serve them; the simple reply is that this choice of a  profit maximizing infor­
pr
mation structure itself requires information,  and it is not apparent how the 
pe aspiring profit maximizer acquires this information,  or what guarantees 
that he does not pay an excessive price for it.  An organization form which  au 
si'
would not be viable in selection equilibrium may be viable if the asymptotic 
eq
behavior of the system involves sufficient variation; the introduction of per­
sisting variation in the demand curve in the example just given would serve 
an 
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form will in fact be profit maximizing unless the dynamic behavior of the sys­
tem is known,  and it is clearly unreasonable to impute to firms a perfect and 
costless ability to predict that behavior!  (In addition,  of course,  the behavior 
of the system depends on the organization forms adopted,  so an attempt to de­
termine the profit maximizing organization form involves making assumptions 
about the organization forms of other firms.  If other firms are assumed to be 
engaged in the same pursuit,  a  conjectural variation problem emerges.) 
The important conclusions to be derived from this reductio ad absurdum 
is that,  in a world in which all information is in ,Some degree imperfect and 
costly,  any attempt to build a  theory of behavior on the assumption that it is 
goal seeking (whether the goal is profits,  utility,  sales,  or something else) 
must involve an as if assumption.  At some level,  a  structuring of the prob­
lem he faces,  and the possession of sufficient free information to solve it, 
must be imputed to the decision maker by the theorist.  The a  priori structure 
and information mayor may not be objectively correct,  but the theory says that 
the decision maker behaves as if  they were objectively correct.  Since the be­
havior predicted depends on this a  priori structure and information,  as well as 
on the assumed goal,  the question arises as to what guides the theorist's choice 
of an as if assumption. 
It is clear that economic selection considerations provide only a  mini­
mal guidance to the theorist who is determined to employ the assumption of 
profit maximization as his basic theoretical tool.  In the example employed 
here,  the firm that purchases information and maximizes profit on the basis 
of that information can be regarded as a  profit maximizer behaving as if the 
information expenditure were optimal.  The firm that sticks to the bottom of 
the average total cost curve and ignores price can be regarded as a  profit 
maximizer behaving as if expenditure on information is not justified because 
price does not deviate from its long run value so far or so persistently as to 
make fine adjustments worth-while.  If asked to judge which type of behavior 
is "closest" to profit maximizing,  most economists would probably pick the 
former,  and probably without inquiring as to the cost of the information.  If 
so,  selection considerations do not necessarily afford them any support. 
Since the selection process does not necessarily discriminate in favor 
of modes of behavior that would ordinarily be considered" close" to profit 
maximizing behavior,  it is worth asking whether other general characteriza­
tions of firm behavior have at least an equal claim to validation by selection 
considerations.  In the example,  the behavior of the firm that always operates 
at the bottom of its average total cost curve might be characterized as ad­
herence to a  simple rule of thumb,  rather than rationalized as attempted 
profit maximization.  In a  somewhat different model,  a  monopolistic com­
petitor which employed a  .. full cost" pricing rule and accepted the resulting 
output policy might survive at the expense of one which went through exten­
sive and expensive calculations to find the price-output combination that 
equated marginal revenue and marginal cost.  An expansion policy based on 
an uncompromising optimism as to the permanence of every increase in de­
mand might bring the incidental benefit of unexpected economies of scale in 
distribution,  which would place the firm in a  highly secure position.  It goes 
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without saying that a  rationalization of these types of behavior in terms of 
profit maximization is available,  but it is certainly simpler just to describe 
the behavior and to note its persistence-which is the character of the state­
ment that firms follow rules of thumb. 
Another general characterization of firm behavior is summed up in 

the term" satisfiCing." 1  There is good reason to argue that this alternative 

characterization of firm behavior receives at least as much support from se­

lection considerations as the standard characterization.  The central feature 

of the satisficing concept is the proposition that decision makers seek" satis­

factory" solutions to problems,  in the sense that the acquisition of more in­

formation and the exploration of alternatives are triggered and sustained by 

the perception that available solutions are unsatisfactory.  This proposition 

can be related to firm behavior at several different levels.  For present pur­

poses,  it is useful to assume that a threat to the firm's survival, or the ap­

pearance of a persistent downward trend in profits or net worth,  will always 

be regarded as an unsatisfactory situation.  On this assumption,  the firm may 

be stimulated to engage in what would ordinarily be termed profit maximizing 

behavior at precisely those times when its survival is endangered. 

There is more to it than this,  however:  When the firm is doing well, 

it will not expend time and money on "search activity."  Thus if a firm is be­

having according to a  routine that is actually viable,  given the existing com-' 

petition of other organization forms and the character of the environment,  it 

I 	 will not be inclined to depart from the routine. 2  It will escape the information
j 	 costs of continuously examining the possibilities in a  wider range of possible 
behavior than it actually displays.  A satisficing firm might therefore escape 
both the dangers of excessive rigidity in response to the changing features of 
the environment and the dangers of excessive attention to relatively unchanging
\  features of the environment. 
-i  The satisficing principle is not,  of course,  a  theory of the firm.  As a 
basic tool for theory construction,  it is certainly no more effective than the j 
profit maximization assumption as a  device for ruling out possibilities.  To I  the extent that selection considerations lend it support,  it is largely because  thel l 
the explicit recognition that conceivable modes of behavior remain uncon­ sH 
sidered provides an escape from the reductio ad absurdum of information  inl 1 
I 
costs.  At some level of analySis,  all goal seeking behavior is satisficing be­ te! 
havior.  There must be limits to the range of possibilities explored,  and those  ex; I  limits must be arbitrary in the sense that the decision maker cannot know that  of 
they are optimal.  The door is open to the question of why the limits are where  ml 
1  they are.  It is also open to the question of what particular types of satiSficing  inl 
behavior may be able to coexist in the economy in the long run.  se 
\ 	 si' , 
\  no 
j  1.  H. A. Simon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," .2£.  cit. 
I  2.  I  use the word" routine" here to mean a pattern of behavior that is fol­
1. lowed repeatedly,  but is subject to change if conditions change.  If  the pat­
tern of behavior were not subject to change,  the description of it would be a 	 za 
th description of the firm's organization form.
I 
pI 
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To sum up,  ihe importance of information costs to the selectior. argu­
ment lies in the fact that,  when information is costly,  the types of closely cal­
culated behavior that economists generally impute to firms may be less viable 
than unsophisticated behavior which simply happens to be well adapted to the 
conditions that actually exist.  A firm that is prepared to respond to unprece­
dented situations in approximately the fashion that economists predict is prob­ !­
ably a firm that is overspending on decision making in the precedented situa­ E! 
tions.  Even if such a  firm can hold its own,  however,  it clearly has no advan­
tage in viability over less sophisticated but well adapted firms - until the un· 
precedented occurs.  At that point,  however,  the response of the economy as 
a whole will not be accurately predicted by a theory which assumes that all 
firms are sophisticated. 
;­
B.  Variability in Behavior and in the Environment 
fly  The analysis thus far suggests that the selection argument affords the 
g  strongest support to the predictions of traditional theory when the situation 
under consideration is one to which firms have been responding for a long time. 
This conclusion must be qualified by reference to all of the other assumptions 
required to establish the conclusion that profit maximizing responses will tend 
to dominate in a  situation that persists long enough; the assumptions that some 
firms actually try such a  response,  that firms do not have protected cost or 
m 	 demand situations,  and that organization forms are scale free seem particu­
larly doubtful.  Nevertheless, it seems useful to consider some of the real 
world implications of this conclusion,  implications which can be derived by 
analogy from the simple models presented but may be less than obvious.  It 
ng  is also appropriate to examine the other side of the coin-the suggestion that 
traditional theory derives little support from selection considerations when it 
a  is applied to novel situations-and consider its implications for economic 
theory.l 
If  the search for profit maximizing behavior is guided by selection 
theory,  it will obviously be led to the situations which are repeatedly and per­
Sistently presented to firms.  Clearly,  one does not expect to find prices mak­
ing an asymptotic approach to a  static equilibrium,  so the selection process 
tests something more than responses to a  single market situation.  One does 
:e 	 expect,  however,  to find prices varying over a limited range for long periods 
t 	 of time,  and only occasionally making marked departures from that range. It 
'e  might be suggested,  therefore,  that business firms approach profit maximiz­
~  ing output choices more closely when prices are within the ordinary range of 
seasonal and cyclical variation than when extreme price movements occur. In 
situations of extremely high demand,  for example,  the selection theory affords 
no reason to expect that firms will not drastically underestimate or overesti­
1.  It should be noted that the prediction of a  closer approximation to maximi­
zation in the more familiar situations can also be derived from the assumption 
that firms gradually learn through experience the best solution to particular 
problems; the two arguments reinforce each other in the cases examined here. 
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mate marginal costs,  or set output at the level suggested by a purely conven­
tional concept of the capacity of the plant.  In situations of extremely low de­
mand, it does not rule out responses which seem to be based on a  confusion 
between average total and marginal costs.  Also,  it is interesting to note that 
the selection process may operate to match production techniques to the output 
decision rules employed.  If all firms followed full cost pricing rules,  there 
would be a  tendency for the selection process to operate in favor of production 
methods for which marginal costs were constant over a  long range and thus to 
force a 	closer approach to maximization in a  rather roundabout way. 
The bUSiness cycle.affords additional examples of decision problems 
which arise repeatedly.  Selection theory might suggest that the skill of firms 
in determining the appropriate time for investment in plant and equipment and 
in inventories should have been well tested by the selection process,  particu­
larly in view of the immediacy of the threat to firm survival that a mistake in 
this area could represent.  There is,  however,  a  pitfall here.  Although they 
are important and keep recurring,  deciSions relating to the timing of invest­
ment are made under conSiderable uncertainty.  Success or failure in predict­
ing market conditions over the cycle may be largely a matter of chance.  Any 
systematic superiority of certain firms over their rivals wi:l take a long time 
to manifest itself in significantly greater growth of the superior group,  since 
the systematic difference will be swamped by the random variation.  A  simi­
lar comment no doubt applies to decisions on research and development spend­
ing.  Although the decisions are of the utmost importance,  the problems of 
prediction involved in making them are so large that the uncertainties may 
swamp any systematic superiority of one firm over another. 
I 
For examples of .. unprecedented" situations firms must sometimes 
cope with,  we may turn to the economic effects of wars,  to the impact of sig­
nificant innovations on non-innovating firms,  or to deep depression or rapid 
inflation.  These situations may present decision problems totally unlike 
those on which the selection process has been doing its work.  Routine be-
ha ,'ior that has proved viable in a  relatively stable environment over a  period
I 
of ;iecades may suddenly become nonviable as a  result of the appearance of 
substitutes or alternative sources of supply of the firm's product.  War and I 
inflation may open up dramatic profit opportunities and equally dramatic dan­ 1 
gers of loss; hence •. reckless" decision making may suddenly become more 1 
I 
pr0fitable and viable than the cautious behavior patterns fostered by an en-

vi r .:mment in which the thinnest margins of cost spell the difference between 

survival and failure.  Severe depreSSion eliminates large numbers of firms 

I 
from the economy,  but behavior patterns that would be viable under more 
normal conditions may be disproportionately represented in the casualty list. 
At the same time,  behavior patterns that were in the process of disappearing 
under more normal conditions may suddenly prove viable-a firm handicapped 
I 	 under normal conditions by poor employee relations and a  high turnover rate 

in its work force may do well when the labor market is weak,  without chang­

ing its beha\ior toward its employees at all. 

It is in these situations of rapid and far-reaching economic change 

that the fruitfulness of a theory of the firm is subjected to test.  As long as 
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~n- conditions remain stable,  it may be difficult to discriminate between behavior 
e­ that is purposively and competently profit maximizing and behavior that hap­
pens to coincide roughly with profit maximizing behavior under those partic­
tat  ular conditions.  When novel situations arise,  the opportunity presents itself 
tput  to find out whether the new profit maximizing re5ponses are made imme­
'e  diately or whether the responses appropriate to the past continue for some 
ion  period.  It is the degree and kind of inertia that firms exhibit in responding 

to 
 to new situations that indicates whether the behavior can best be described in 
terms of close calculation and attempted maximization,  or whether it should 
s  be described  in terms of general adherence'to rules of thumb,  modified when 
ms  circumstances require by gradual learning,  imitation,  or by random search. 
md 
u­ C.  Common Subjective Constraints 
in 
As was explicitly noted,  much of the immediately preceding discus­ ey 
sion is qualified by its dependence on an assumption that when firms are con­
fronted by the same decision problem repeatedly over a  long period of time, .ct­
some firms actually adopt the profit maximizing solution to this problem.  If ny 
ne  the profit maximizing solution is attempted,  selection may operate to make it 
dominant.  I now consider the reasons why this assumption may fail,  even in :e 
a  society in which the desire for pecuniary gain is an important motivation. t­
The fundamental reason is that the larger social process of which the 'nd­
economy is a part may condition all decision makers to a  common view of 
what is feaSible or acceptable behavior for a firm.  The profit maximizing 
response may be ruled out by the constraints that decision makers believe to 
exist or choose to recognize.  For example,  it may well be that bribery of 
rI­ judges,  civil servants and the employees of other firms is indulged in to a . 
lesser extent than,  objectively speaking,  the pursuit of maximum profits 
would dictate.  Observance of ethical constraints may nevertheless be viable 
behavior,  provided the rewards of nonobservance are not too great and the 
moral force of the constraints is generally recognized.  Similarly,  com­
monly held subjective constraints on the amount of interest that it is moral 
to charge,  or on the amount of profit per unit it is moral to obtain,  may make 
1- adherence to "just price" precepts a  viable mode of behavior.  It goes with­
out saying that a  general reluctance to exploit success by expanding one's 
firm and competing with one'S neighbors could severely limit the effective­
ness of the selection process.  Finally,  commonly held views of what is and 
is not feasible may make non-maximizing behavior viable; farmers in under­
developed countries perSist for years in using production techniques that are 
objectively obsolete,  and it is often argued that Similar behavior can be ob­
served in industry in advanced countries. 
)d 
g 
These examples of common subjective constraints sugg"st well known ed 
themes in economic history.  The selection process does not assure that capi­
talistic behavior will be typical in traditional societies.  It is also true,  how­
ever, that subjective constraints which do not impose objective limits on the 
behavior of market participants may prove to be fragile once they are chal­
lenged by some innovator-hence the familiar pattern of successful innovation 
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V1.  CONCLUSIONS 
When interpreted in the strongest possible terms,  the selection argu­
ment says that all organization forms that are viable in the long run are 
profit maximizing organization forms.  So interpreted,  the argument is 
either meaningless or false.  It is meaningless if it is meant to apply to a 
world of imperfect and costly information in which decision makers can never 
hope to obtain all the information needed to know what information should be 
obtained and what decisions l'!lade.  In such a world the concept of profit max­
imization must abstract from some information costs,  but there is no obvi­
ously valid choice of a level of analysis at which the abstraction should be 
made.  Widely divergent types of behavior may be "profit maximizing" in 
this limited sense,  depending on the choice made.  The argument is false if 
it is meant to apply to a theoretical world of perfect information,  unless every 
conceivable state of the world occurs not once,  but repeatedly,  in the selection 
process.  Granting this implausible assumption,  there remain the assumptions 
that organization forms are scale free,  that some firms exist which are actu­
ally profit maximizers,  and so on. 
On a more restrictive interpretation,  the argument says that the re­
sponses of surviving firms to situations that occur persistently will be profit 
maximizing responses.  In this version,  it is still qualified by the assumptions 
that some firms try the profit maximizing responses,  that organization forms 
are scale free and profitable firms expand,  and that continuing entry of non­
maximizing firms is a negligible consideration.  If  these assumptions are met, 
the argument nevertheless does not validate the use of traditional comparative 
statical analysis if the effect of the parametric change is to carry the system 
outside of its previOUS range of variation.  The selection process does not dis­
criminate among organization forms with respect to responses outside that 
range,  but the conclusions of comparative statics typically depend on those re­
sponses being profit maximizing.  Also,  the fact of positive information costs 
actually affords some reason to expect,  on selection theory grounds,  that re­
sponses to novel situations will not be profit maximizing. 
Therefore,  to the extent that selection considerations support the use 
of traditional economic theory,  they do so only under special circumstances 
and for a  restricted range of applications.  Furthermore,  the process of iden­
tifying in the real world those circumstances and applications in which tradi­
Bau tional theory receives support is not a process that is adequately guided by 
]
traditional theory.  Adequate guidance would necessarily involve,  among 
other things,  consideration of the determinants of the organization forms of 
Bee newly entering firms and delineation of the circumstances under which firms 
make basic policy changes that amount to changes in organization form. 
These weaknesses in the selection argument do not imply that theo­
Ber ries based on the assumption of profit maximization are invalid and fruitless. 
] They do imply that any such theory must stand on its own feet,  that is, on 
the adequacy of its assumptions as to motivations,  availability of informa­
Enl! tion,  and decision processes.  The selection mechanism is not likely to res­
cue the predictions of the theory if the assumptions on these matters are 
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fundamentally wrong.  There may be a  reason why a theory of the firm based 
on assumptions that do not agree with direct observation should nevertheless 
be expected to be fruitful,  but the selection argument is not such a  reason. 
Finally,  the limitations of the selection argument as a  justification for 
conservatism in theoretical matters should not be taken to imply that the sys­
tematic examination of selection processes is without value.  In conjunction 
[" 	 with direct observation of business behavior,  selection theory can playa use­
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